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Abstract
We analyze whether a consumer driven health care plan like the newly established Health
Savings Accounts (HSAs) can reduce health care expenditures in the United States and in-
crease the fraction of the population with health insurance. We use an overlapping genera-
tions model with health uncertainty and endogenous health care spending. Agents can choose
between a low deductible- and a high deductible health insurance. If agents choose to pur-
chase the high deductible health insurance, they are allowed to contribute tax free to an HSA.
We examine the steady state effects of introducing HSAs into a system with private health
insurance for young agents and Medicare for old agents. Since the model is a general equi-
librium model, we fully account for feedback effects from both, factor markets and insurance
markets. Our results from numerical simulations indicate that HSAs can decrease total health
expenditures by up to 3% of GDP but increase the number of uninsured individuals by almost
5%. Furthermore, HSAs decrease the aggregate level of health capital and therefore decrease
output. We also address possible extensions of the HSA reform that include the eligibility to
pay health insurance premiums with HSA funds, the full privatization of Medicaid via HSAs,
and Medicare for workers.
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1 Introduction
In 2003 about 250million Americans became eligible to save tax free for their health care expenses
in special Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) via the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act. HSAs were introduced with two main goals in mind. The first goal was
to control the rise in health expenditures, and the second goal was to increase the number of
Americans with health insurance.
Can HSAs deliver on these goals? Evidence is sparse, and the discussion has become increas-
ingly polemic. Proponents of HSAs hail consumer driven health care plans as the panacea to the
health care problem in the United States (Goodman (2004)1), whereas opponents discredit the
idea as “more tax cuts for the rich” (Burman and Blumberg (2003)).
Since data is sparse, research on HSAs has focused on micro-simulations and partial equi-
librium models (e.g. Keeler, Malkin, Goldman and Buchanan (1996), Ozanna (1996), Zabinski,
Selden, Moeller and Banthin (1999), Pauly and Herring (2000), and Cardon and Showalter (2007))
and concentrated on the moral hazard and adverse selection aspects of the insurance component
of HSAs.2 This literature is inconclusive as to whether HSAs decrease total health expenditures.
Estimates range from decreases in total health expenditures of 8% to increases in total health
expenditures of 1%. One of the first empirical studies on HSAs by the Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO (2006)) finds that higher income households are more likely to have HSAs. The
same study did not find a pattern on which age groups are more likely to have HSAs. Another
empirical study by Greene, Hibbard, Dixon and Tusler (2006) confirms that healthier workers
with higher educational attainment are more likely to buy into high deductible health insurances.
While there is an emerging empirical literature on the effects of HSAs, we find a paucity of
economic models that address the macroeconomic implications of reforming the U.S. health care
system with HSAs. Since at this point there is no reliable data on HSAs available, substantial
insight can be gained from a carefully designed simulation that is model based, allows for policy
predictions, and is supported by economic theory. In order for such a model to be credible it must
include an adequate representation of intertemporal consumption choice and major institutional
features of HSAs. In addition, such a model has to go beyond partial equilibrium analysis because
HSAs have the potential to significantly change the savings portfolio of U.S. households in the
long run. This will create large general equilibrium effects via factor markets and insurance
markets, especially since health is a major component of human capital (e.g. Grossman (1972)
and Schultz (2002). It is important to include these feedback channels when analyzing the effects
of HSAs on the entire economy.
In this paper, we analyze HSAs from a macroeconomic perspective and focus on whether
the introduction of HSAs can reduce aggregate health expenditures and increase the number of
insured individuals. To our knowledge, this is the first model that captures the general equilibrium
effects of HSAs in a framework with endogenous health choice and health uncertainty.3
1Compare also the publications of the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) at
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba464/
2Four countries have implemented HSAs so far — Singapore, South Africa, China (experimental stage), and the
United States. We present a brief summary of the literature on HSAs in these countries in Appendix B, which is
available on the authors’ website at: http://mypage.iu.edu/~juejung/Papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
3Macroeconomic frameworks that model tax sheltered savings accounts or endogenous health capital formation,
but not both, include Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998) who address the savings effects of individual
retirement accounts. Jeske and Kitao (2005) provide a mechanism to model the institutional details of choosing
between private health insurance bought in the group market or the individual market. Suen (2006) uses a
variant of a Grossman (1972) model with endogenous expenditure on medical treatments that increase the health
capital of an agent. He investigates how growth in health expenditures is driven by technological factors and
health accumulation. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) investigate the role of targeted social insurance on the
asset distribution in the U.S. Palumbo (1999), who estimates a health uncertainty model using U.S. data. Models
addressing the effects of Medicare on labor supply, retirement decisions, and moral hazard include Rust and Phelan
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We use an overlapping generations model with health uncertainty that is similar to Jeske and
Kitao (2005) and calibrate it to match U.S. data. In contrast to Jeske and Kitao (2005), medical
expenses are endogenous in our model and are used to build up health capital. Health capital is
a key component into the formation of human capital which enters the production process. In
addition, we model the institutional setup of HSAs together with a standard savings technology.
Agents are borrowing constrained in the sense that they are not allowed to hold negative net
asset positions.4 In our experiment we introduce HSAs into an economy that is calibrated to
U.S. data before the introduction of HSAs. We then study the macroeconomic effects caused
by HSAs. This framework not only allows us to make statements about endogenous health
plan choices, the formation of health insurance premiums, and aggregate spending on health but
also on aggregate effects of physical capital formation, human capital formation, and the wealth
distribution. The model explicitly accounts for general equilibrium effects from price changes in
factor markets and insurance markets on savings and health care expenditures. Micro simulations
and partial equilibrium models do not account for these effects.
In numerical simulations we find that HSAs can indeed decrease total health expenditures
in the economy by up to 3%. However, at the same time the number of uninsured individuals
increases by up to 5%. The decrease in aggregate health expenditures is a direct result of the
prevalence of high deductible insurances after HSAs are introduced. High deductible insurances
increase the relative price of health services, so that households shift their spending from health
care to consumption goods. Lower health care spending decreases health capital in the economy.
Since health capital enters the formation of human capital, lowering aggregate health expenditures
will have a negative effect on output. This is the first general equilibrium channel that feeds back
into the household decision problem. In addition, HSAs stimulate the accumulation of physical
capital because large portions of savings become tax free. However, since larger savings in physical
capital are not enough to compensate for the loss in productive human capital, aggregate output
declines. This decreases household income and increases the number of people without health
insurance. We conduct sensitivity analysis and find that the parameter determining whether
health capital is also an investment good is key in establishing whether HSAs increase the number
of insured workers (extensive margin) and decrease total health expenditures (intensive margin).
We also find that as health capital becomes more of a pure consumption good, the differences
between partial equilibrium results and general equilibrium results become substantial. Partial
equilibrium results then grossly overstate aggregate health levels in the economy. In addition, we
show that the annual contribution limit to HSAs plays a key role in determining the fraction of
the insured population. With a high enough annual contribution limit, HSAs will decrease total
health expenditures and increase the number of insured workers. The downside of this is lost
government revenue and a likely increase in the fiscal deficit.
In the next section, we describe the institutional details of HSAs and discuss the goals of HSAs.
In section 3 we introduce our model and define the equilibrium. We address the calibration of
the benchmark economy without HSAs in section 4. In section 5, we compare the benchmark
economy to U.S. data. Policy experiments are described in section 6. In an extension, we
also address current health care reform proposals. First, we address the Affordability in the
Individual Market Act (S.2554) which proposes to extend eligible health expenses of HSAs to
include health insurance premiums. Finally, we run policy experiments that simulate both, the
total privatization of Medicare in an economy with HSAs and the expansion of Medicare to
(1997), Gilleskie (1998), French and Jones (2004), Khwaja (2002), and Khwaja (2006).
4Without a borrowing constraint households would make the maximum allowable contribution to their HSAs if
interest rates were fully tax deductible (this was possible until 1986). Borrowing constraints can either be modeled
as a wedge between the interest rates on borrowing and lending, or a threshold on the minimum asset position.
See also Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998) for a further discussion.
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the population younger than 65. We conclude our findings in section 7. Appendix A contains
all tables and figures. Appendix B contains a brief history of HSAs in the U.S. and describes
the experience of Singapore, China, and South Africa with HSAs. Furthermore, Appendix B
discusses the solution algorithm and contains a section explaining the estimation technique for
health shock transition probabilities.5
2 Institutional Details of HSAs
An HSA is similar to a Flexible Spending Account (FSA), Health Reimbursement Account (HRA),
Individual Retirement Account (IRA), or 401(k) in the sense that funds are deposited into the
account out of pretax income and interest accumulates tax free. HSAs can only be established
in conjunction with a qualified High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP). A qualified HDHP must
have at least a $1, 100 deductible for an individual ($2, 200 for a family). Any individual who is
covered by an HDHP, not covered by other health insurance, not enrolled in Medicare, and not
claimed as a dependent on someone else’s tax return is eligible for an HSA. Contributions can
be made by either the employer, the employee, or both, but the HSA is owned by the employee.
The maximum annual contribution is $2, 850 for an individual ($5, 650 for a family). Distribution
of the funds is tax-free if taken for “qualified medical expenses” (which now includes over-the-
counter drugs). Unused funds are rolled over at the end of the year. Currently, funds cannot
be used tax-free to pay premiums of health insurance with some exceptions. Funds withdrawn
for non-medical purposes are subject to a 10% penalty tax (except in cases of death, disability,
or Medicare eligibility) and regular income tax. After the account holder turns 65, the 10% tax
penalty no longer applies. In case of death the HSA can be transferred tax-free to a spouse.6
In general, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) have four objectives: (i) reduce health care
costs, (ii) lower premiums and thereby increase the number of insured individuals, (iii) change
the structure of health care into a fully funded system where high savings rates increase growth
rates, and (iv) put the patient into the center of the health care decision making process. With
our model we are able to address the first two objectives. We do not model population aging
but our model does explicitly take the savings effect of HSAs into account. We do not model the
ex-post moral hazard problem embedded in the last objective.
The high deductible health care plans are said to encourage individuals to be more prudent
consumers of health care, because they will be responsible for the cost of health care below the
deductible. They are therefore more likely to limit health care use to necessary, cost-effective
services.7 In addition, the consumer is expected to “shop” for the best offer available in the market
(e.g. buy generic drugs instead of brand names, compare prices for certain health procedures,
etc.), as stated in Goodman (2004).
Whether or not HSAs reduce costs is controversial. Nahata, Ostaszewski and Sahoo (2005)
and Buntin, Damberg, Haviland, Kapur, Lurie, McDevitt and Marquis (2006) conclude that
HSAs may be able to reduce some of the distortions introduced by traditional health insurance
and have a moderate effect on preventing cost increases. Ozanna (1996) finds a decrease between
2% to 8% in health spending after the introduction of HSAs, whereas Keeler et al. (1996) find
those ranges to be between a 1% increase to a 2% decrease. Heﬄey and Miceli (1997) show that
MSAs have the potential to induce socially efficient levels of health activities and preventive care,
raising the expected wealth of consumers without reducing insurers’ profits.
5Appendix B is available on the authors’ website at: http://mypage.iu.edu/~juejung/Papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
6Appendix B contains all institutional details of HSAs and the important differences to the alternative forms
of tax sheltered savings.
7See also Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz and Marquis (1987) on how cost sharing affects the
demand for medical servics. The RAND experiment shows that catastrophic insurance plans with copayments can
reduce health expenditures significantly.
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Watanabe (2005), on the other hand, finds that a HSA itself encourages health care consump-
tion by lowering the effective price of health care. The cost-containment effect, in contrast, comes
from the high deductible of the attached catastrophic insurance plan. The overall effect of the
HSA program is ambiguous. Park, Greenstein and Friedman (2006) even warn that the “over-
funding” of HSAs may encourage individuals to obtain additional elective health care services
and increase total health expenditures. Remler and Glied (2006) conclude that due to the large
amount of cost sharing that is already present in today’s health insurance policies (e.g. FSAs
or HRSs), the estimation results of older studies overpredict the potential cost savings of HSAs.
Zabinski et al. (1999) use a microsimulation (MEDISIM) to show that a MSA combined with
catastrophic health insurance will tend to crowd out comprehensive coverage. This results in
premium spirals in the comprehensive coverage markets, which hurts poorer families and families
with children. Hoffman and Schwartz (2006) and GAO (2006) report similar results.
The second goal of HSAs is concerned with increasing the number of individuals with health
insurance. This is an important goal as there are 45 million uninsured Americans. HSAs promise
to decrease premiums so that more people can afford health insurance. However, Glied and
Remler (2005) estimate that the tax savings via HSAs will increase the number of newly insured
adults by less than 0.3% of the current adult uninsured population. This small number is the
result of the relatively low response rate of low income adults to buy insurance with additional
income from tax savings. Low income adults are the largest group within the uninsured population
(Hoffman and Schwartz (2006)).
We partly address the third goal of HSAs which is concerned with the effect of a fully funded
system on savings and growth. Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1998) find that the
introduction of tax favored retirement accounts with a modest annual contribution limit can
increase the steady state capital stock by more than 6%. Whether HSAs will have a similar
effect in the U.S. is questionable since there already exist a large number of tax sheltered savings
vehicles. Poterba, Venti andWise (1995) have shown that the introduction of tax preferred 401 (k)
plan did increase net savings despite the availability of a close savings substitute like individual
retirement accounts (IRAs) . We do not model tax sheltered alternatives but find much smaller
increases in steady state capital stock (around 1.5%) after the introduction of HSAs.
3 The Model
3.1 Demographics
We use an overlapping generations framework. Agents work for J1 periods and then retire for
J − J1 periods. In each period there is an exogenous survival probability of cohort j which we
denote πj. Agents die for sure after J periods. Deceased agents leave an accidental bequest that
is taxed and redistributed equally to all agents alive. Population grows exogenously at an annual
net rate n. We assume stable demographic patterns, so that similar to Huggett (1996), age j
agents make up a constant fraction µj of the entire population at any point in time.
The relative sizes of the other generations alive µj is recursively defined as
µj =
πj
(1 + n)
years
J
µj−1,
where years denotes the number of years modeled. The relative size of agents dying each period
(conditional on survival up to the previous period) can be defined similarly as
νj =
1− πj
(1 + n)
years
J
µj−1.
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3.2 Preferences
The consumer values consumption and health, so that her within period preferences are
u (cj , hj) =
(
c
ηj
j h
1−ηj
j
)1−σ
1− σ
,
where c is consumption, h is the health stock, ηj is the age dependent intensity parameter of
consumption, and σ is the inverse of the relative risk aversion parameter.8
3.3 Production of Health
We use the idea of health capital as introduced in Grossman (1972). In this economy there are two
commodities: a consumption good c and medical services m. The consumption good is produced
via a neoclassical production function that is described later. We do not model a production
sector for medical services. Each unit of consumption good can be transformed into 1pm units of
medical care. All medical care is used to produce new units of health. The accumulation process
of health is given by
hj = φjm
ξ
j + (1− δ (hj))hj−1 + εj, (1)
where hj denotes the current health status, φjm
ξ
j denotes the production of new health with inputs
of medical caremj and parameters ξ > 0, φj being an age dependent productivity parameter, and
δ (hj) is the health deterioration rate which depends on the current health status. This partly
captures the “immediacy” of health expenditures. The longer the agent waits to treat her health
shock, the larger the health depreciation becomes. Finally, εj is an age dependent health shock,
where εj ≤ 0. The relative price of health and consumption can be expressed as pm
(
1
φξm
1−ξ
)
,
where the term in brackets is the marginal contribution to health of an additional unit of health
care.9
The agent has to decide how much to spend out-of-pocket on medical care. We only model
discretionary health expendituresmj in this paper. Income will have a strong effect on endogenous
total medical expenses. Our setup assumes that given the same magnitude of health shock εj a
richer individual will outspend a poor individual. This may be realistic in some circumstances.
However, a large fraction of health expenditures are probably non-discretionary (e.g. health
expenditures caused by a catastrophic health event that requires surgery etc.). In such cases a
poor individual could still incur large health care costs. We do not cover this case in the current
model.10
8An alternative way of formulating this problem and reducing the state space would be to let total health
expenditure mj enter the utility function directly. We only model discretionary health expenditues (see next
section for a discussion on health expendiures). Depending on the realization of the health state εj , the relative
weight in the utility function of discretionary health expenditures mj changes, so that
u (cj ,mj , zj) =
(
c
γ1
j m
γ2(εj)
j
)1−σ
1− σ
,
where γ2 (εj) is a decreasing function in the health status variable εj . As the health state worsens, the consumer
puts more weight on health expenditures in her utility function. Another way of thinking about this is health
maintenance. If health deteriorates, the health maintenance costs are higher and therefore the consumer is willing
to spend more on health care which establishes new relative rates of marginal utilities between consumption and
health expenditures.
9Compare Suen (2006) for a similar formulation.
10One method to include this would be to distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary health ex-
penditures. The consumer can freely decide on how much to spend on discretionary health expendiures mj (e.g.
preventive health check-ups, upgrades in hospitals, etc.) but incurs non-discretionary health expenditures m¯ (εj)
6
3.4 Exogenous Health Shocks
Exogenous health shocks εj follow a Markov process with age dependent transition matrix Pj.
Transition probabilities from one state to the next depend on the past health shock εj−1 so that
an element of transition matrix Pj is denoted
Pj (εj, εj−1) = Pr (εj|εj−1, j) .
3.5 Human Capital Profile
Effective human capital over the life-cycle evolves according to
ej =
(
eβ0+β1j+β2j
2
)χ (
hθj−1
)1−χ
for j = {1, ..., J1} , (2)
where β0, β2 < 0, β1 > 0 and χ ∈ [0, 1] . This mimics a hump-shaped income process over the
life-cycle and makes the wage income of agents dependent on their health state as well. Tuning
parameter θ allows us to gradually diminish the influence of health on the production process
and individual household income without holding the exogenous age dependent component fixed.
This parameter determines to what degree health becomes an investment good.
3.6 Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses and Insurance
We do not distinguish between group insurance (employer provided) and individual insurance
(bought by individuals in the private insurance market).11 We therefore combine elements of
group insurance (e.g. tax deductibility of premium payments) with elements from the individual
market (e.g. screening by age). We think this is a good compromise to make a statement about
the entire private insurance market.
Cutler and Wise (2003) report that about two thirds of the population younger than 65
is covered by some form of private insurance. The majority of these contracts is offered via
employment contracts and premiums paid are thus tax deductible. Only 10% of these contracts
are bought directly from insurance companies by the households. Premiums for these contracts
are not tax deductible.
In the model, the working agent can decide between a low deductible health insurance, a
high deductible health insurance, or no health insurance. These health insurances are employer
provided so that health insurance premiums are tax deductible. In addition, we assume that
health insurance companies can screen the worker by age but not by health status.12 We can
interpret the model as if the employee can choose to work for three different types of employers.
Employer one is offering a low deductible health insurance via an insurance company, employer
two is offering a high deductible health insurance via a different insurance company, and employer
type three offers no health insurance. The tax deductible health insurance premium that enters
which are a function of her health shock εj (e.g. hospital visits due to serious health problems, emergency health
care, etc.). The total health expenditure would then be denoted
pmm¯ (zj) + pmmj .
11Jeske and Kitao (2005) present a model where this is modeled specifically.
12We are aware that employers are not allowed to discriminate according to health status or age when offering
health insurance. However, given the discussion above, we think this is still an acceptable assumption. In addition,
between 2000 and 2002, older workers experienced rising unemployment rates that were greater in relative mag-
nitude than those for younger workers over the same period (Six (2003)). This suggests that older worker are more
likely to lose their employer provided health insurance. They are then forced to buy insurance in the individual
market, where they have to pay higher premiums because of their age.
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the workers budget constraint together with the wage income can then be interpreted as the
effective wage income. As a consequence, an employee with a health insurance package receives
a lower effective wage than an employee working a job without health insurance. Since we do
not model employer matching we abstract from this process and simply claim that the employee
can make the employment and insurance type choice. This also allows us to only have one
representative firm that pays one wage rate. Employees then decide on their efficiency wage by
deciding which insurance they want to have.
Insurance companies offer two types of health policies, a low deductible policy with deductible
ρ and copayment rate γ at a premium pj and a high deductible policy with deductible ρ′ and
copayment γ′ at a premium p′j. These premiums are tax deductible.
In order to be insured against a health shock, households have to buy insurance the period
before their health shock is realized. Agents in their first period of life are thus not covered by
any insurance. We distinguish between three possible insurance states inj−1 = {1, 2, 3} , where
inj−1 = 1 is the state of having a low deductible health insurance in period j, inj−1 = 2 denotes
the high deductible health insurance in period j and inj−1 = 3 indicates that the agent has no
health insurance in period j. The household’s out of pocket health expenditure when young and
working if j ≤ J1 is therefore denoted
oW (mj) =


min [pm,Insmj , ρ+ γ (pm,Insmj − ρ)]
min [pm,Insmj , ρ
′ + γ′ (pm,Insmj − ρ
′)]
pm,noInsmj
if inj−1 = 1,
if inj−1 = 2,
if inj−1 = 3,
where pm,ins is the relative price of health expenditures paid by insured workers and pm,noIns
is the price of health expenditures paid by the uninsured worker. An uninsured worker pays a
higher price pm,noIns > pm,ins. The copayment rate γ is the fraction the household pays after the
insurance company pays (1− γ) of the post deductible amount pm,Insmj − ρ. Since households
have to buy insurance before health shocks are revealed we assume that working households in
their last period j = J1 already decide to buy into Medicare.
After retirement all agents are covered by Medicare. Each agent pays a fixed premium pMed
every period for Medicare. Medicare then pays a fixed fraction
(
1− γMed
)
of the health expendit-
ures that exceed the amount of the deductible ρMed. The total out of pocket expenditures of a
retiree are
oR (mj) = min
[
pm,Medmj, ρ
Med + γMed
(
pm,Medmj − ρ
Med
)]
, if j > J1 + 1,
where pm,Med is the price of health expenditures that retirees with Medicare have to pay. An
agent’s out of pocket expenses when retired can still be paid with funds from the HSAs. The
Medicare premium also qualifies for penalty free deductions from HSAs. In addition, Medicare
is financed by a payroll tax τMed. We assume that old agents j > J1+1 do not purchase private
health insurance and that their health costs are covered by Medicare and their own resources
plus social insurance (e.g. Medicaid) if applicable.13
13According to Jeske and Kitao (2005) many old agents purchase various forms of supplementary insurance. The
fraction of health expenditures covered by such insurances is small. According to the Medical Expendiure Panel
Survey (MEPS) 2001, only 15% of total health expenditures of individuals older than 65 is covered by supplementary
insurances. Cutler and Wise (2003) report that 97% of people above age 65 are enrolled in Medicare which covers
56% of their total health expenditures. Medicare Plan B requires the payment of a monthly premium and a yearly
deductible. See Medicare and You (2007) for a brief summary of Medicare.
According to MEPS data from 2003, only 1.35% of the population older than 65 is not covered by Medicare. The
same survey finds that 10.13% have Medicaid and Medicare, 54.95% have Medicare and private insurance combined
(62.97% of those have private group insurance whereas 36.89% have private individual insurance, the rest have
some other form of private insurance combined with Medicare), and 33.57% have only Medicare. (Available at:
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3.7 Health Savings Accounts
If agents buy a high deductible insurance they can decide on how many assets amj they want to
carry into the next period tax free at the market interest rate. Agents can only contribute to
their HSA when they are younger than 65. Agents can pay their out-of-pocket medical expenses
o (mj) directly with savings from their HSAs. If they oversave in HSAs they can roll over the
account balance into the next period.14 Savings accumulate tax free.
If agents decide to use funds from the HSA to pay for non qualified health expenses, they
have to pay a tax penalty at rate τm and forgone income tax. This penalty only applies to agents
younger than 65 years. Agents older than 65 can use the money in their HSA for non-health
related expenses without having to pay the tax penalty τm. However, they have to pay income
taxes on income spent in this way.
If they undersave and the funds in the HSAs do not cover all medical expenses, then the
household has to use standard savings income to finance her residual medical expenses and
consumption when old. In addition, there is an upper limit on the annual contribution to an
HSA which we denote s¯m.15
3.8 Households
Age j year old agents enter the period with state vector xj =
(
aj−1, a
m
j−1, hj−1, inj−1, εj
)
, where
aj−1 is the capital stock at the beginning of the period , amj−1 is the capital stock accumulated in
HSAs at the beginning of the period, hj−1 is the health state at beginning of the period, inj−1
is the insurance state in period j (chosen by the agent in the previous period j − 1), and εj ∈
{ε1j, ε2j , ε3j, ε4j , ε5j} is one of five possible negative health shocks where 0 ≥ ε1j > ε2j > ..., ε5j.
The state vector of a household not counting age j is defined as
xj =


(
aj−1, a
m
j−1, hj−1, inj−1, εj
)
∈ R+ ×R+ ×R+ × In
w ×R− = D if j ≤ J1,(
aj−1, a
m
j−1, hj−1, inj−1, εj
)
∈ R+ ×R+ ×R+ × In
R ×R− = D if j > J1,
where InW = {1, 2, 3} and InR = {1, 2}. Retired agents have only two insurance states, InR = 1
they have Medicare Plan B and InR = 2 they don’t have Medicare Plan B in their first period
of retirement. Thereafter all retirees are forced to have Medicare Plan B, so that inj−1 = 1, for
j > J1 + 1. For each xj ∈ D (xj) let Λ (xj) denote the measure of age-j agents with xj ∈ D.
The fraction µjΛ(xj) then denotes the measure of age-j agents with xj ∈ D with respect to the
entire population of agents in the economy.
3.8.1 Workers (Younger than 65)
Agents receive income in the form of wages, interest income, accidental bequests, and social
insurance. The latter guarantees a minimum consumption level of c. After health shocks are
realized, agents simultaneously decide their consumption cj, stocks of capital for the next period
aj, and health expendituresmj. They also pick the insurance state for next period inj = {1, 2, 3} ,
which requires them to pay a premium pj for inj = 1, p′j for inj = 2, or nothing for inj = 3.
If agents decide to buy a high deductible insurance, i.e. if inj = 2, then they are eligible
to hold amj in an HSA. If they do not purchase a high deductible insurance for the following
http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/download_data/pufs/pmep04/pmep04_table5.shtml)
14This feature distinguishes HSAs from Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs).
15The contribution limit to HSA for 2007 for individuals is $2, 850. Compare http://www.treas.gov/offices/public-
affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml
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period, then they are not eligible for HSAs anymore and they have to dissolve their existing
HSAs completely.16
In their last period of work, agents decide whether to buy into Medicare Plan B. We make
the assumption that premium payments for Medicare Plan B are not tax deductible and that
agents can only continue to save in HSAs if they buy into Medicare Plan B. We later calibrate
the model so that all workers in their last period buy into Medicare Plan B.17
With HSAs we have to distinguish in each period between agents who contribute to HSAs
and those who take funds out of HSAs. Among those who do not contribute each period, we
have to further distinguish between those that use these funds for health related expenses and
those that use them for consumption. The latter have to pay a penalty tax τm when they are
younger than 65 years old. In addition, they have to pay forgone income tax on funds withdrawn
for non-qualified expenses.
The household problem for young agents j = {1, ..., J1 − 1} who are net contributors can be
formulated recursively as
V
(
aj−1, a
m
j−1, hj−1, inj−1, εj
)
= max
{cj ,mj,aj ,amj ,inj}
{
u (cj, hj) + βπjEε
[
V
(
aj, a
m
j , hj , inj, εj+1
)
|εj
]}
s.t. (3)
cj + aj + 1{inj=2}a
m
j + o
W (mj) + 1{inj=1}pj + 1{inj=2}p
′
j
= w˜j +R
(
aj−1 + T
Beq
)
+Rmamj−1 − Taxj + T
SI
j ,
hj = φjm
ξ
j + (1− δ (hj))hj−1 + εj ,
0 ≤ NIj ≤ s¯
m,
0 ≤ aj , a
m
j ,
where
oW (mj) =


min [pm,Insmj , ρ+ γ (pm,Insmj − ρ)]
min [pm,Insmj , ρ
′ + γ′ (pm,Insmj − ρ
′)]
pm,noInsm
if inj−1 = 1,
if inj−1 = 2,
if inj−1 = 3,
,
NWj = R
mamj−1 − o
W (mj) , (4)
NIj = a
m
j −max [0, NWj ] ,
w˜j =
(
1− 0.5τSoc − 0.5τMed
)
wej, (5)
Taxj = τ˜
(
y˜Wj
)
+ 0.5
(
τSoc + τMed
)(
w˜j − 1{inj=1}pj − 1{inj=2}p
′
j
)
,
y˜Wj = w˜j + raj−1 +RT
Beq −NIj ,
TSIj = max
[
0, c+ Taxj − w˜j −R
(
aj−1 + T
Beq
j
)
−
(
Rmamj−1 − o
W (mj)
)]
.
16This is a simpifying assumption. What the law actually states is that if the policy holder ends her participation
in the HDHP (High Deductible Health Plan), she loses eligibility to deposit further funds, but funds already in
the HSA remain available for use. Since our period is actually 9 years long, we think that the assumption that the
agent has to completely dissolve the account in that period is not too strong.
17Although Medicare Plan B payments are itemizable as qualified medical expenses in the income tax
statement, there is the additional provision that says that only medical payments that exceed 7.5% of
the adjusted gross income (Form 1040, line 38) are tax deductible. Compare the IRS publication at:
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p502/ar02.html#d0e299
What we implicityly assume here is that Medical expenses do not exceed this limit and therefore premiums for
Medicare are not tax deductible.
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Variable cj is consumption, aj is next period’s capital stock, a
m
j is next period’s capital stock in
HSAs, s¯m is the maximum contribution into HSAs per period, oW (mj) is out-of-pocket health
expenditure, mj is total health expenditure, pj is the insurance premium for the low deductible
health insurance, p′j is the insurance premium for the high deductible health insurance, w˜j is
wage income net of the employer contribution to Social Security and Medicare, R is the gross
interest rate paid on assets aj−1 from the previous period and accidental bequests T
Beq
j , Taxj is
total taxes paid18 and TSIj is Social Insurance (e.g. Medicaid and food stamp programs). The
fact that we use w˜j in the tax base for income tax τ˜
(
y˜Wj
)
leads to a double taxation of a portion
of wage income due to the flat payroll tax 0.5
(
τSoc + τMed
)
w˜j that is added. This mimics the
institutional feature of income and payroll taxes.19
NWj is net wealth in the HSA after subtracting out-of-pocket health expenses, NIj is net
investment in the HSA, wej is the effective wage income. The function τ˜
(
y˜Wj
)
captures pro-
gressive income tax, 0.5
(
τSoc + τMed
)
w˜j is the payroll tax that the household pays for Social
Security and Medicare, and τmNIj is the penalty tax for non-qualified withdrawals from the
HSA, y˜Wj is the tax base for the income tax composed of wage income and interest income on
assets and accidental bequests. We subtract net contributions NIj to HSAs because they are tax
deductible.
For net contributors it has to hold that NIj ≥ 0, that is, next periods funds a
m
j in the HSA
have to be larger than the funds at the beginning of the period minus the allowed health related
expenditures (e.g. out-of-pocket health expenses oW that can be financed with HSA funds).
For net non-contributors the corresponding constraints are
NIj < 0,
Taxj = τ˜
(
y˜Wj
)
+ 0.5
(
τSoc + τMed
)(
w˜ (εj)− 1{inj=1}pj − 1{inj=2}p
′
j
)
− τmNIj ,
with all other constraints being the same as for contributors. Net non-contributors draw funds
from HSAs beyond what is allowed so that NIj < 0 and therefore pay the penalty tax τm on the
part spent on non-health related expenditures τmNIj . In addition they pay the forgone income
tax, since the term NIj is negative and enters the base for taxable income y˜
W
j .
The Social Insurance program TSIj guarantees a minimum consumption level c. If Social
Insurance is paid out then automatically aj = a
m
j = 0 and inj = 3 (the no insurance state) so
that Social Insurance cannot be used to finance savings, savings into HSAs and private health
insurance.20
18 If health insurance was provided by the employer, so that premiums would be partly paid for by the employer,
then the tax function would change to
Taxj = τ˜
(
y˜
W
j
)
+ 0.5
(
τ
Soc + τMed
)(
w˜j − 1{inj=1} (1− ψ) pj − 1{inj=2} (1− ψ) p
′
j
)
,
where ψ is the fraction of the premium paid for by the employer. Jeske and Kitao (2005) use a similar formulation
to model private vs. employer provided health insurance. They pick ψ = 0.85 based on MEPS data in 1997. We
simplify this aspect of the model and assume that all health insurance policies are offered via the employer and that
the employee pays the entire premium, so that ψ = 0. The premium is therefore tax deductible in the employee
(or household) budget constraint.
19Compare Social Security Tax Reform (Art#3).
20The stipulations for Medicaid eligibility encompass maximum income levels but also maximum wealth levels.
Some individuals who fail to be classified as ’categorically needy’ because they have to many savings could still be
eligibile as ’medically needy’ (e.g. caretaker relatives, aged persons older than 65, blind individuals, etc.)
We will therefore make the simplifying assumption that before the Social Insurance program kicks in the indi-
vidual has to use up all her wealth. Jeske and Kitao (2005) follows a similar approach.
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Agents can only buy insurance if they have sufficient funds to do so, that is whenever
pj < w˜j +R
(
aj−1 + T
Beq
j
)
+Rmamj−1 − o
W (mj)− Taxj , or
p′j < w˜j +R
(
aj−1 + T
Beq
j
)
+Rmamj−1 − o
W (mj)− Taxj .
The social insurance program will not pay for their health insurance. In their last working period
J1 agents decide whether to buy Medicare insurance or not. This determines their insurance
state in the first period of retirement. Agents have to enrol in Medicare in order to keep their
HSAs. From J1 + 1 onwards, all agents are forced into Medicare.
3.8.2 Retired Agents
Retired agents in their first period of retirement are insured under Medicare if workers in their
last period decided to buy into Medicare Plan B. From then onwards we force retirees to buy
into Medicare insurance until they die. Retirees in general, that is, all agents with age j > J1 are
not allowed to make tax exempt contributions to HSAs anymore (that is agents older than 65).
So they are all classified as net non-contributors. In addition, the tax penalty τm for non-health
expenditures of HSA funds does not apply anymore. However, if the individual uses HSA funds
for non-health related expenditures, she has to pay income tax. Retirees can pay the Medicare
insurance premium pMedj with funds from the HSA.
The household problem for a retired agent j ≥ J1 + 1 who is a non-contributor and pays no
penalty can be formulated recursively as
V
(
aj−1, a
m
j−1, hj−1, inj−1, εj
)
= max
{cj ,mj,aj ,amj }
{
u (cj, hj) + βπjEε
[
V
(
aj, a
m
j , hj , inj, εj+1
)
|εj
]}
s.t.
cj + aj + a
m
j + o
R (mj) + p
Med
j = R
(
aj−1 + T
Beq
j
)
+Rmamj−1 − Taxj + T
Soc
j + T
SI
j ,
hj = φjm
ξ
j + (1− δ (hj))hj−1 + εj ,
NIj = 0, (6)
0 ≤ aj , a
m
j ,
where
oR (mj) =
{
min
[
pm,Medmj , ρ
Med + γMed
(
pm,Medmj − ρ
Med
)]
if inj−1 = 1,
pmm if inj−1 = 2,
NWj = R
mamj−1 − o
W (mj)− p
Med
j ,
NIj = a
m
j −max [0, NWj ] ,
Taxj = τ˜
(
y˜Rj
)
,
y˜Rj = raj−1 +RT
Beq
j −NIj,
TSIj = max
[
0, c+ oW (mj) + Taxj + p
Med
j −R
(
aj−1 + T
Beq
j
)
−Rmamj−1 − T
Soc
j
]
.
Non-contributors who use HSA funds for non-health related expenses have to pay income tax
on these funds (no penalty τm applies for agents older than 65). Therefore only constraint (6)
See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility
for details on Medicaid eligibility.
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changes to
NIj < 0,
and all other conditions are the same as in the previous case.
3.9 Insurance Companies
Insurance companies satisfy their budget constraint within each period. We allow for cross
subsidizing across generations. The constraints for two insurance companies selling the low and
high deductible health insurance respectively are
(1 + ω1) ∗
∑J1+1
j=2
µj
∫ [
I{inj(xj)=1} (1− γ)max (0, pm,Insmj (xj)− ρ)
]
dΛ(xj) (7)
= R
∑J1
j=1
µj
∫
I{inj(xj)=1}pjdΛ(xj) , and
(1 + ω2) ∗
∑J1+1
j=2
µj
∫ [
I{inj(xj)=2}
(
1− γ′
)
max
(
0, pm,Insmj (xj)− ρ
′
)]
dΛ(xj)
= R
∑J1
j=1
µj
∫
I{inj(xj)=2}p
′
jdΛ(xj) , (8)
where ω1 and ω2 are markup factors that determine the profits of insurance companies, I{inj(xj)=1}
is an indicator function equal to 1 whenever agents bought the low deductible health insurance
policy and I{inj(xj)=2} is an indicator function equal to one whenever agents bought the high
deductible insurance. Since agents have to buy their insurance one period prior to the realization
of the health shock, first period agents are not insured. In addition, this lag implies that insurance
premiums gain interest over one period. We clear low and high deductible insurances separately
by adjusting the respective premium. Profits are redistributed in equal amounts to all surviving
agents. Alternatively, we could discard the profits (“thrown in the ocean”). In this sense we
think of them as loading costs (fixed costs) associated with running private insurance companies.
3.10 Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms that use a standard Cobb-Douglas technology. Firms
solve
max
{K,L}
{
AKαL1−α − qK −wL
}
, (9)
taking (q,w) as given.
3.11 Government
The government taxes workers’ income (wages, interest income, interest on bequests) at a pro-
gressive tax rate τ˜ (y˜j) which is a function of taxable income y˜ and finances the social insurance
program TSI as well as government consumption G. The government budget is balanced so that
G+
∑J
j=1
µj
∫
TSIj (xj) dΛ(xj) =
∑J
j=1
µj
∫
Taxj (xj)dΛ(xj) . (10)
Government spending G plays no further role (“thrown in the ocean”).
Accidental bequests are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion to all households
∑J
j=1
µj
∫
TBeqj (xj) dΛ (xj) =
∑J1
j=1
νj
∫
aj (xj) dΛ(xj) +
∑J
j=J1+1
νj
∫
aj (xj)dΛ (xj) ,
(11)
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where νj denotes the deceased mass of agents aged j in time t. An equivalent notation applies
for the surviving population of workers and retirees denoted µj.
The Social Security program is self-financing
∑J
j=J1+1
µj
∫
TSocj (xj)dΛ(xj) (12)
=
∑J1
j=1
µj
∫
0.5τSocwej (xj) + 0.5τ
Soc
(
w˜j (xj)− 1{inj(xj)=1}pj − 1{inj(xj)=2}p
′
j
)
dΛ(xj) .
The Medicare program is self-financing (and paid on a pay-as-you go basis so that the insur-
ance premiums do not accumulate interest from last period)
∑J
j=J1+1
µj
∫ (
1− γMed
)
max
(
0,mj (xj)− ρ
Med
)
dΛ(xj) (13)
=
∑J1
j=1
µj
∫ [
0.5τMedwej (xj) + 0.5τ
Med
(
w˜j (xj)− 1{inj(xj)=1}pj − 1{inj(xj)=2}p
′
j
)]
dΛ(xj)
+
∑J
j=J1+1
µj
∫
pMedj dΛ(xj) .
3.12 Equilibrium
Definition 1 Given the exogenous number of health shock realizations Z, transition probabilities
Pj,Z−5 ×Z
−
5
, realizations of health shocks εj = {ε1j, ε2j , ε3j, ε4j, ε5j}
J
j=1 , the survival probabilities
{πj}
J
j=1 and the exogenous government policies
{
τ˜ (y˜ (xj)) , τ
K
}J
j=1
, a competitive equilibrium
with health savings accounts is a collection of sequences of distributions
{
µj,Λj (xj)
}J
j=1
of
individual household-worker decisions
{c (xj) , a (xj) , am (xj) , m (xj) , in (xj)}
J
j=1 , aggregate stocks of physical capital and labor {K,L} ,
factor prices {w, q,R} such that
(a) {c (xj) , a (xj) , a
m (xj) ,m (xj) , in (xj)}
J
j=1 solves the consumer problem (3) ,
(b) the firm first order conditions hold
w = α2
Y
L
,
q = α1
Y
K
R = q + 1− δ,
(c) markets clear
K′ = S =
∑J
j=1
µj
∫
(a (xj) + a
m (xj))dΛ(xj) ,
L =
∑J1
j=1
µj
∫
e(j, εj , xj)dΛ(xj) ,
(d) the aggregate resource constraint holds
G+ S +
∑J1
j=1
µj
∫
(c (xj) + pm (xj)m (xj))dΛ (xj) = Y + (1− δ)K,
(e) the government programs clear so that (11) , (12) , (13) , and (10) hold,
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(f) the budget constraints of insurance companies (7) and (8) hold
(g) the distribution is stationary
Λ (xj+1) =
∑J
j=1
µj
∫
1{
a′=a(xj), am′=am(xj), m′=m(xj)
}P (ε′, ε) dΛ(xj) ,
where 1 is an indicator function.
We use a standard numeric algorithm to solve the model.21
4 Calibration
This section mirrors the model section in its structure. We use the model without HSAs as the
benchmark model in the calibration and target key ratios from the U.S. National Income Accounts
(NIPA), the U.S. Census and the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). In addition, we
match some features of the U.S. demographics and the U.S. life cycle profile. Table 1 contains
a summary of all model parameters and table 2 contains policy parameters. The model is just
identified. The number of free parameters and the number of moments we match in the data is
48. We indicate in tables 1 and 2 which moments were particularly influenced by the respective
parameter. We next describe the calibration in more detail.
4.1 Demographics
One period is defined as 9 years. We have J = 8 periods, so that we effectively model households
from age 20 to 92, that is 72 years. The annual conditional survival probabilities
{
πaj
}92
j=20
are
taken from the U.S. Life-Tables 2003.22 Since one period is 9 years we have to transform the
annual survival probabilities
{
πaj
}92
j=20
into per-period survival probabilities {πj}
J
j=1 according
to the following procedure
π1 = π
a
20; π2 = Π
9
i=1π
a
20+i; ...;πJ = Π
9
i=1π
a
20+8×(J−1)+i.
We plot the survival curves in panel 1 of figure 1.We then recursively define the number of agents
alive according to
µj =
πj
(1 + n)
years
J
µj−1,
where we adjust the annual exogenous population growth rate n by the length of the period
(yearsJ =
72
8 = 9 years in our 8 period model). We slightly overstate the population growth rate
n = 2.5% compared to the 1.2% population growth rate of the past 50 years in the U.S. in order
to match the fraction of the old population.23 Given our parameter choices, the total population
over the age of 65 is 13.97% which is between the numbers in the U.S. Census (12.4%) and the
20% used in Jeske and Kitao (2005) who only look at heads of households.
4.2 Preferences
The relative risk aversion parameter takes a standard value, σ = 1.5. The weight of consumption
in the utility function is age dependent and summarized in vector
21We discuss the algorithm in Appendix B, which is available on the authors’ website at
http://mypage.iu.edu/~juejung/Papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
22 ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Publications/NVSR/54_14/Table01.xls
23Compare: http://www.susps.org/overview/numbers.html
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ηj = {0.65, 0.95, 0.96, 0.96, 0.95, 0.85, 0.80, 0.80} . In conjunction with the magnitudes of the
health shocks these weights ensure that the model matches total health spending and the take-up
ratio of health insurance. We thereby assume that the very young and the very old have a higher
preference weight on their health than the middle aged. We need the relatively large preference
for health of the young generation in order for them to buy insurance in the model. The annual
discount factor is β = 1.025 to match the capital output ratio and the interest rate.
4.3 Production of Health
The productivity parameter φj of the health production function is age dependent and sum-
marized in vector φ = {1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.65, 1.65} . This is similar to the production
parameter in Suen (2006) for a very similar production function of health. The second para-
meter is picked at ξ = 0.35. We do not have data on these parameters and conduct sensit-
ivity analysis. We assume that health depreciation depends on the current health state but
is independent of age and current health care spending. Health depreciates at rates between
δ (hj = hmin) = 1 − 0.80
(years/gJ) = 0.8658 and δ (hj = hmax) = 1 − 0.87
(years/gJ) = 0.7145.
We chose this structure so that health depreciates faster when the health state is already low.
This feature captures the urgency of treatment. We pick these numbers to match total health
expenditures in the economy and the take up ratios for insurance over the life-cycle. Section 5
contains a summary of how well the model matches the data.
4.4 Exogenous Health Shocks
4.4.1 Transition Probabilities
We estimate the health shocks in the law of motion of health capital using data from seven
waves of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).24 We first use a linear probability model
and estimate expression (1) where we impose that health capital hj can attain five possible
health states. These health states correspond to five self reported health states in the HRS. In
addition, we impose an AR(1) structure on the health shocks (the errors in expression (1)).25
After estimating the AR(1) process for the shocks, we simulate health shocks for 10, 000 agents
for each of 10 starting health shocks that we obtain from the data.We then collect the shocks into
five risk classes and label them from 1 (lowest shock) to 5 (highest shock). We then count how
many of the simulated agents move from health shock 1 at age j − 1 to health shocks 1, 2, ..., 5
at age j. This will give us the conditional transition probabilities P (εj |εj−1 = 1). We follow the
same procedure for εj−1 = {2, 3, 4, 5} . We adjust for the period length of 9 years and allow for
age group specific transition probabilities. In an eight period model this will result in seven 5×5
Markov switching matrices. Since we need one Markov switching matrix for each generation,
we impose that the first two age groups have the same Markov switching matrix between health
shocks.26 All transition matrices for all 8 age groups are reported in table 1 in Appendix B which
24We use the RAND-HRS version that contains survey data from 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.
25This step could also be estimated with an ordered logit specification, since health states are discrete and follow
a natural ordering. The choice of the linear probability model allowed for easier incorporation of the AR(1) error
structure in a panel robust estimator, Stata’s xtregar command. The results are not affected significantly by the
choice of this estimator. For more details on using an ordered logit specification to estimate Markov transitions
between health states and comparisons to other estimation techniques we refer to Jung (2006).
26Alternatively we could estimate an AR1 process for the health shocks in expression (1) and then use Tauchen’s
method (see Tauchen (1986) or Heer and Maussner (2005) for more details) to transform the estimated AR1
process into a discrete Markov switching process. However, this method determines the Markov switching matrix
P (εj |εj−1) along with the magnitudes of the shock vector εj = {ε1j , ..., ε5j} which resulted in very poor fits of the
insurance take-up ratios. It turned out to be crucial to be able to chose the magnitudes of the shock vector εj so
as to match the insurance take-up rates. We therefore decided to use the procedure described in the main text
which only pins down the Markov switching matrix and allows for choosing the shock magnitudes separately.
16
also contains the details about the estimation technique.27
4.4.2 Magnitude of Health Shocks
The shocks to health εj = {ε1,j, ε2,j, ..., ε5,j} are picked so that the insurance coverage take-up
rate (percentage of workers buying the low deductible health insurance per age group) and the
share of medical spending in GDP is approximated. Table 3 presents the matrix of age dependent
health shocks associated with each one of the five health states.28 In order to identify the model
we put restrictions on the shock structure. Shocks 1, 2, and 3 do not change over age for worker
and shocks 1,2,3, and 4 do not change over age for retirees. All other shocks are unrestricted, so
that the number of free parameters from the 8× 5 shock matrix is 20.
4.5 Human Capital Profile
Effective human capital evolves according to expression (2). We use the following estimates
for
{
βˆ0, βˆ1, βˆ2
}
= {8.12, 0.14, −0.0016} . These estimates are obtained by fitting a second order
polynomial to summarized income data from the CPS (see Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance
Coverage in the United States: 2005 (2006)), according to
log (income) = β0 + β1age+ β2age
2 + ε.
This represents the exogenous part of expression (2) . We next take the endogenous part into
account. We can get a better fit of the human capital profile when we slightly adjust β2. The
model then reproduces the hump shaped average efficiency units of the human capital profile after
the health process is taken into account. Setting β2 = −0.0015 results in the effective human
capital profile depicted in panel 2 of figure 2. We normalized the profile and compare it to the
normalized income profile from the data. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2004) show similar
income patterns using data from the Consumer Expenditures Survey over the period 1980-1998.
For parameter χ we pick 0.85. We pick this rather large weight on age because it produces more
stable results as the feedback from the endogenous health choice is diminished. We also do not
want to inflate the effects of health. We are not aware of any estimates for parameter χ and
will therefore conduct sensitivity analysis. We set parameter θ = 1 in the benchmark economy.
This value ensures that health capital is also an investment good. We later conduct sensitivity
analysis and completely turn off the investment function of health by setting θ = 0. In this case
health capital is a pure consumption good.
4.6 Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses and Insurance
4.6.1 Age Dependent Insurance Premiums, Coinsurance Rates and Deductibles
Insurance premiums are age dependent. We use a base premium p0 and an exogenous age
dependent premium growth rate gj to calculate the premium for each age group. We express the
premium of j year old agents for high and low deductible health insurances as
pj = p0 × gj , and p
′
j = p
′
0 × gj .
27Appendix B is available on the authors’ website at: http://mypage.iu.edu/~juejung/Papers/hsa_appendixB.pdf
28We were not able to match the medical expenditure profile. Medical expenditures of an average individual is
roughly 20% of her income. Suen (2006) finds that the ratio of medical spending to income by age for 2000 is
around 10% for individuals under age 65 and 60% for individuals over 65. The model overpredicts spending of the
young generations and underpredicts spending of the old.
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We estimate a common growth factor for insurance premiums (both low and high deductible
insurance premiums grow at the same rate gj for each age group j) gj using summary data on
individual health insurance premiums from The Cost and Benefit of Individual Health Insurance
Plans (2005). We use a simple second order polynomial to fit the growth rate of age dependent
premiums which results in an estimate of the following equation
gj = x0 + x1 × age+ x2 × age
2 + ε.
The estimates for the regressors are {xˆ0, xˆ1, xˆ2} = {0.7781, 0.0036, 0.0007} . We present the age
dependent premium growth rates in panel 2 of figure 1.29
For the coinsurance rate we follow Suen (2006) and pick γ = 25% for the low deductible
insurance. The coinsurance rate for the high deductible insurance is slightly lower at γ = 20%.
We pick this number lower so that in the benchmark economy the majority of agents buys the
low deductible insurance. The coinsurance rate for Medicare γMed is also 25%.30
Since deductibles are level variables, calibrating them is more involved because we need to
find expression for suitable ratios that can be normalized. In the following we match the ratios
of the deductibles against each other, that is ρ/ρ′ and ρ/ρMed as well as some ratios of average
insurance premiums to median income
(∑
j µjpj
)
/med (income) and finally, ratios of deductibles
themselves to median income and insurance premiums, e.g. ρ/med (income) , ρ′/med (income) ,
ρMed/med (income) , ρ/
∑
j µjpj, ρ
′/
∑
j µjp
′
j , and ρ
Med/
∑
j µjp
Med
j .
The average deductible for the low deductible insurance is around $305 as reported in Fronstin
and Collins (2006), whereas the average deductible for high deductible plans is around $2, 330.31
Since the data in Fronstin and Collins (2006) is highly aggregated we view the $305 deductible
for the low deductible insurances as a lower bound. The average deductible for Medicare plans
is around $1, 076 according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.32 We then
get the following ratios: ρρ′ =
305
2,330 = 0.13 and
ρ
ρMed
= 3051,076 = 0.28.
There is conflicting information as to the premiums of low vs. high deductible insurances.
According to the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA) choosing a catastrophic health
insurance plan can drop premiums significantly, some estimates claim by as much as 25% to
50%.33 According to Claxton, Gabel, Gil, Pickreign, Whitmore, Finder, DiJulio and Hawkins
29Jeske and Kitao (2005) report comparable insurance premiums for different income groups. In their model
with three worker age cohorts they find that workers in the third age group (50− 65 years old) pay roughly 3 to
4 times as much in insurance premiums than workers in the first age cohort (20− 35 years old). This is similar to
our results.
Another summary of premiums per age that results in similar age markups is available at:
www.ahipresearch.org/pdfs/Individual_ Insurance_Survey_Report8-26-2005.pdf
30According to Medicare News from November 2005 the coinsurance rates for hospital services under the Out-
patient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) will be reduced to 20% of the hospital’s total payment. Overall,
average beneficiary copayments for all outpatient services are expected to fall from 33% of total payments in 2005
to 29% in 2006.
Visit: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1506
31A 2005 national employer health benefits survey (as reported inGAO (2006)) found that employers’ HSA-
eligible plan deductibles were, on average, nearly six times greater than those for employers’ traditional plans.
This is very close to the ratio we use here.
32Compare: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1557
33http://www.ncpa.org/prs/cd/2005/20050829.htm or http://www.insureme.com/content/rsrc/health/catastrophic-
health-insurance/?Refby=615245&gclid=CP7S1d7LoIwCFRlmWAod5Xk0PA
According to www.hsasale.com, a website specializing in providing HSA insurance to individuals and businesses,
it is claimed that traditional low deductible insurance premiums are almost 3 times as large as high deductible
insurance premiums.
GAO (2006) reports that in a 2005 national employer health benefit survey it was found taht HSA-eligible
premiums were on average 35% less than traditional plans premiums for single coverage and 29% less for family
plans.
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(2006) the average annual premium paid by an individual is $4, 049 for an HMO, $4, 385 for a
PPO, $4, 168 for a POS, and $3, 405 for a high deductible plan. Using these numbers the ratio
of average premiums of high vs. low deductible insurances is
∑
j µjpj∑
j µjp
′
j
= 4,1003,405 = 1.2.
On the other hand, Fronstin and Collins (2006) report that average premiums of high de-
ductible insurances tend to be higher than average premiums of low deductible insurances. This
is explained by the fact that more people in high deductible plans buy coverage through the
individual market and therefore have to pay the full cost of their premiums. People with high
deductible plans offered by their employers are more likely to be employed by small firms which
face higher premiums than large firms. According to their results average premiums for compre-
hensive (low deductible) plans are roughly $1, 203 whereas average premiums for high deductible
plans were around $2, 027. These numbers result in a ratio of average premiums for low vs. high
deductible insurances equal to
∑
j µjpj∑
j µjp
′
j
= 1,2032,027 = 0.6.
According to the U.S. Department of Health the premium for Medicare Part A is $393 per
month in 2006. This premium is however not paid by 99% of beneficiaries. The premium for
Medicare Part B is $88.50×12 = $1, 062 per year which is roughly a fourth of the average premium
paid by individuals who are still working.34 We therefore find that the ratio of the average low
deductible insurance premium to the average Medicare premium is around
∑
j µjpj∑
j µjp
Med
j
= 1,2031,062 =
1.13 using the data from Fronstin and Collins (2006). If we use the data from Claxton et al.
(2006) we have
∑
j µjpj∑
j µjp
Med
j
= 4,1001,062 = 3.86. We use these numbers as respective lower and upper
bounds.
In the next step we try to relate the deductibles and the insurance premiums to median income.
According to data from the U.S. Census real median household income in the United States
reached $46, 326 in 2005. Factoring in the average household size of 2.6 in 2005 we get a median
per capita income of $46, 326/2.6 = 17, 817 which results in ratios of: ρmed(income) =
305
17,817 = 0.017,
ρ′
med(income) =
2,330
17,817 = 0.13,
ρMed
med(income) =
1,076
17,817 = 0.0604,
∑
j µjpj
med(income) =
$1,203
$46,326/2.6 = 0.07, and∑
j µjpj
med(income) =
$4,100
$46,326/2.6 = 0.2301.
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Finally, we relate the deductibles themselves to the average premiums paid. We get the
following deductible vs. average premium ratios for the low deductible plan ρ∑
j µjpj
= 3054,100 =
0.076 and ρ∑
j µjpj
= 3051,203 = 0.25. For the high deductible plan we have
ρ′∑
j µjp
′
j
= 2,3303,500 = 0.66
and ρ
′∑
j µjp
′
j
= 2,3302,027 = 1.15 , and for Medicare it is
ρMed∑
j µjp
Med
j
= 1,0761,062 = 1.
In our benchmark model without HSAs, the average premium for low deductible insurance
is 0.88 vs. 1.22 for the high deductible insurance and the premium for Medicare is 0.72. These
premiums result in premium ratios that are close to the ratios in the data. All ratios, data and
model generated, are reported in table 9.
4.6.2 Price of Medical Services
In order to pin down the relative price of consumption goods vs. medical care goods, we use the
average ratio of the consumer price index (CPI) and the Medical CPI between 1992 and 2006.
We calculate the relative price to be pm = 1.52.
36
34Compare: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1557
35For the U.S. Census data compare: http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_wealth/007419.html
and
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_submenuId=factsheet_0&_sse=on
36Compare: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu
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The price of medical services for uninsured agents is higher than for insured agents. Various
studies have pointed to the fact that uninsured individuals pay up to 50% (and more) higher
prices for prescription drugs as well as hospital services (see Playing Fair, State Action to Lower
Prescription Drug Prices (2000)). Kaiser (2000) of the Kaiser Foundation reports that the un-
insured pay 14.6% higher prescription drug prices (not counting promotions for insurers). Their
summaries are based on a study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (see
Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization, and Prices: Report to the President (2000)).
Anderson (2007) finds that the uninsured pay up to 2.5 times the amount that insured patients
pay when hospital services are included. Finally, Brown (2006) finds that uninsured consumers
in California pay 65% more for common prescription drugs than the federal government does
for the same medications. The national average is a markup of around 60% for the uninsured
population.
We therefore pick a markup factor of 1.6 so that pm,nIns = 1.6×pm,Ins. According to the U.S.
Census 2004, the fraction of the population without insurance is roughly 15.7%.37 Using all this
information we solve the following system of equations for the relative prices that the insured
and uninsured pay for medical services{
1.52 = 0.843× pm,Ins + 0.157× pm,nIns,
pm,nIns = 1.6× pm,Ins,
which results in pm,nIns = 2.2226 and pm,Ins = 1.3891. This assumes that the overall price
difference between consumption and health services is a weighted average of the prices that the
insured and uninsured pay for health services.
4.7 Health Savings Accounts
There is an annual contribution limit to HSAs. According to the Revenue Procedure 2006-53 the
upper limit is s¯m = $2, 850 for an individual ($5, 350 for a family).38 In order to relate the level
of the upper limit to variables in the model we will tie the contribution limit to the deductible
using the following formula
s¯m = ρ′ × (1 + ν) ,
where ν is a markup on the high deductible ρ′. Since the average high deductible is around $2, 330
according to Fronstin and Collins (2006) we get a markup factor of (1 + ν) = s¯
m
ρ′ =
$2,850
$2,330 =
1.2232. We start with ν = 0.2232markup in the benchmark economy and conduct sensitivity ana-
lysis in figure 6, where we use the following savings limits: s¯m = {$2, 680; $2, 850; $3, 025; $3, 455, $4, 310, $5, 825}.
The tax penalty for withdrawing funds that are not used for eligible health expenses is τm = 10%.
4.8 Insurance Companies
The fraction of insured in our model economy is highly sensitive to the equilibrium prices of
insurance contracts. We start the baseline model with a zero profit condition on insurance
companies, ω = 0, and let the base premiums p0 and p
′
0 adjust to satisfy the the budget constraint
of the insurance companies.
37http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/hlthin04/hlth04asc.html
38Compare http://www.treas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/07IndexedAmounts.shtml
According to the original rule of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 the maximum contribution to an HSA
per year was the lesser of the amount of the high deductible ρ′ or the upper limit ρ¯ = $2, 850 for an individual
($5, 350 for a family) so that the maximum contribution a¯m was a¯m = min [ρ′, ρ¯].
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4.9 Firms
We choose a standard capital share in production of α = 0.33. Total factor productivity A = 4.
Capital depreciation δ = 10% so that the depreciation per period is 1 − (1 − δ)(years/J) =
1 − 0.972/8 = 0.6126. Depreciation is picked to match the capital output ratio and the interest
rate.
4.10 Government
The tax penalty for withdrawing funds from HSAs before the age of 65 and using them on non-
health related consumption is τm = 10%. Social security taxes are τSoc = 2× 6.2% on earnings
up to $97, 500. This contribution is made by both employee and employer. The Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance Security tax rate is a little lower at 10.6% and has been used by Jeske and
Kitao (2005) in a similar calibration. We therefore match τSoc at 10.6% picking the appropriate
pension replacement ratio Ψ to be 21%.39 The size of the social security program is then 6% of
GDP. This is close the number reported in The 2002 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of
the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2002) which
is 5% for 2002.
Medicare taxes are τMed = 2 × 1.45% on all earnings again split in employer and employee
contributions (see Social Security Update 2007 (2007)). In order to get an appropriate premium
for Medicare pMed, so that the Medicare premium is lower than the private health insurance
premiums, we have to pick the payroll tax (which helps to finance Medicare) sufficiently high.
We pick τMed = 4% which leads to a slightly larger Medicare program (4.44% of GDP) than
what we observe in the data (2.5% of GDP according to 2002 Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust
Funds (2002)).
The income tax rates are summarized in table 4 and reflect U.S. income tax rates as of 2005.
We follow Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2007) and estimate the following equation using the
information in table 4
marginalTaxRate (income) = β0 + β1 log (income) + ε, (14)
where marginalTaxRate (income) is the marginal tax rate that applies when taxable income
equals income. Variable income is household income normalized with an assumed maximum
income level of $400, 000. That is, we divide all income information in table 4 by $400, 000 and
fit equation (14) to the normalized income data. The estimated coefficients for the tax function
are then βˆ0 = 0.3411 and βˆ1 = 0.0659 so that the income tax function becomes
T (income) =
marginalTaxRate(income)︷ ︸︸ ︷
[0.3411 + 0.659× log (income)]× taxable income, (15)
where T (income) is total income tax paid. In addition, we impose a lower boundary of 0% and
an upper boundary of 35% on the marginal income tax rate. Picking the maximum income level
at $400, 000 will affect the estimates for the marginal tax function in (14) since it will determine
the “tax bins” that individuals fall into. We report a graph of the approximation of the marginal
tax rate against the tax code in panel 3 of figure 1. Note that the approximated marginal income
39Social security transfers are defined as TSocj (x) = Ψwej (hj−1) and they are the same for all agents. Transfers
are a function of the active wage of a worker in her last period of work, so that j = J1. In addition we assume
that hj−1 is a constant and the same for all agents. We pick it to be equal
h0,J1
+hggridh,J1
2 , which is the “middle”
health state of the health grid vector. Biggs, Brown and Springstead (2005) report a 45% replacement rate for the
average worker in the U.S. and Whitehouse (2003) finds similar rates for OECD countries.
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tax is slightly below the marginal income tax from the tax code. We think this is justified since
we do not explicitly account for negative income tax of low income households as well as tax
loopholes.
In our model, we similarly normalize taxable income of every agent with the maximum income
of the richest agent in the economy to get the normalized variable income.We use this normalized
income directly in (15) to get the marginal tax rate and the sum total of payable income tax
for each individual.40 Since income tax revenue is collected to pay for the social insurance
program TSI (e.g. foodstamps, etc.) and the residual becomes government consumption G, we
want to make sure that the size of government consumption also conforms to the data. The
maximum income level of $400, 000 we chose earlier (when estimating the tax function) together
with the model generated income across agents allows for GY = 20.3% compared to 20.2% reported
in Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull (2003). The marginal income tax function with the
assumed upper limit in income of $400, 000 produces a very good approximation of the government
size.41
5 Numerical Results of the Benchmark Model
In this section we report the results of the benchmark model without HSAs.
5.1 Number of Insured Workers in Low and High Deductible Health Plans
Panel one in figure 2 shows the fraction of insured workers and distinguishes between private and
public insurance. We overlay the information from the data with the insurance take-up ratios
from the model. For the latter we distinguish between low and high deductible health insurance.
In the model we concentrate on private insurance for workers and public insurance (Medicare)
for retirees. We see that the model slightly underestimates the takeup rate of insurance for young
workers and overestimates the takeup rate for older workers.
We calibrate the fraction of agents buying the low deductible insurance to be 51% and the
fraction buying the high deductible insurance at 2.5% of all workers. These are underpredictions
caused by the modelling assumption that requires agents to buy insurance one period prior to
being insured. Therefore, the first generation of workers is always uninsured by construction and
will “artificially” decrease the fraction of uninsured workers. Once we exclude the first generation
and calculate the fraction of insured workers from the second period onwards we find that about
40Two other methods are known to us to determine the marginal income tax rate of an individual. The first
is to use the tax structure given in table 4 directly to determine the marginal income tax for each individual.
Assuming again a maximum income level of $400, 000 and then dividing the income groups into percentiles using
this upper bound would determine the marginal income tax of a particular individual. This method introduces
more discontinuities than the smooth tax function of the earlier method.
Second, Miguel and Strauss (1994) estimate a similar tax function that mimicks the progressivity of the U.S.
income tax system. This functional form is
τ˜ (y˜) = a0
(
y˜ −
(
y˜
−a1 + a2
)− 1
a1
)
,
where y is total income earned and τ˜ (y˜) represents total taxes paid. Parameter a0 is the limit of marginal
taxes in the progressive part as income goes to infinity, a1 determines the curvature of marginal taxes and a2
is a scaling parameter. Average and marginal tax rates are then τ˜(y˜)
y˜
= a0
(
1− (1 + a2y˜
a1)
− 1
a1
)
and τ˜ ′ (y˜) =
a0
(
1− (1 + a2y˜
a1)
− 1
a1
−1
)
respectively. This functional form is often used in calibrated life-cycle modelling (e.g.
Smyth (2005), Jeske and Kitao (2005) and Conesa and Krueger (2005)). We think the method described above
fits our purpose best and approximates the U.S. income tax structure well.
41The average marginal income tax rate τ¯ is estimated to be between 21.5% to 32.1% according to Stephenson
(1998) and Barro and Sahasakul (1986) respectively. Our model’s average marginal tax rate is lower at 11%.
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76.5% of workers buy private health insurance. The split between low and high deductible
insurance is 95.4% vs. 4.6%. According to MEPS data of 2005, 86.1% of the population under
age 65 do have health insurance, of which 70.1% is private and 16% is public. In addition, almost
100% of all retired workers do have health insurance.
The model’s low take up ratio for the high deductible insurance needs some justification.
First, the data is ambiguous on the market share of low vs. high deductible insurance. Table 6
presents the percentage of health insurance policies grouped by the size of the deductible.42 We
see that roughly 57% of all privately purchased insurances by individuals have a deductible that
is larger than $1000 dollars and that 39% of all plans purchased by families have a deductible
exceeding $2000. This survey indicates that a large portion of the population might already hold
high deductible insurance policies that would entitle them to have HSAs. These numbers present
a stark contrast to a survey by Fronstin and Collins (2006) who sampled 3, 158 privately insured
adults between age 21 and 64. They find that enrollment in HDHPs that would qualify for HSAs
is roughly 8% and that only 1% is currently holding HSAs.
We think that the second data source is more reliable. Since the benchmark model is the
one without HSAs accounts, we practically model the situation in the U.S. prior to 2003. We
therefore think the low take up rate of high deductible insurances of only 4.6% is justified.
5.2 Medical Expenditures
We match two important measures of medical expenditures; the share of medical spending as a
fraction of GDP and the distribution of medical expenditures by population size.43
First, the model overstates total medical expenditures in terms of GDP which is roughly 16%
according to Baicker (2006). The model reports 17.6%. This overprediction is partly explained
by the omission of public health insurance that is available to workers (e.g. Medicaid, Veterans’
Benefits, etc.) and that can potentially contribute to lowering health care costs.
Second, we report the distribution of health care expenditure by population size in table 7.
The data of the health expenditure concentration is from MEPS 2002 as summarized in Yu and
Ezzati-Rice (2005). We see that a small share of the population is responsible for a large amount
of total health expenditures e.g. 1% of the population is responsible for 22% of total health
expenditures, 10% percent of the population spends almost 64%, and 50% of the population
spends 97%. The model matches the high concentration of health care expenditures fairly well.
The model slightly understates the concentration of the 1% of highest spenders to spend 20.6%
of the total amount spent on health vs. 22% reported in the data. The model underpredicts the
concentration of health care spending if we look at larger shares of the population. At higher
percentages the model’s match improves again. The 50% of the highest spenders of health care
are responsible for 92.5% of total health expenditures in the model which is close to the 97% in
the data.
5.3 Wealth Distribution
Table 8 reports the asset and income distributions of the model by quintiles and compares them
to data. The data is from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and from Budria-
Rodriguez, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2002). The model does not match the wealth
42The data is from a sample of more than 62,000 individual and family health insurance policies purchased
through www.eHealthInsurance.com in March 2004, on which premiums were paid in the preceding months since
August 2003. This semi-annual study is designed to monitor the cost and comprehensiveness of benefits included
in health insurance policies purchased by consumers, representing what is available to 94 percent of the U.S.
population.
43Another measure of health expenditures, the medical expenditure profile, is not matched well by the model.
The model overstates health care spending of the young as a fraction of their income and understates the fraction
of health spending as a percentage of income of the elderly.
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and income distributions accurately. One of the main reasons is the lack of a bequest motive. We
therefore cannot match the high wealth concentrations that we observe in U.S. data. Including
a bequest motive into the current framework poses a challenge, both on theoretical as well as on
computational grounds.44 The wealth Gini coefficient is 0.73 which is smaller than the 0.80 from
1998 data but closer than the Gini coefficient in Jeske and Kitao (2005) who report 0.5704 in
their calibration. Their model also lacks a bequest motive. The Gini coefficient of income is 0.43
in the model compared to 0.553 from Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002).
Second, Panel 3 in figure 2 shows the asset distribution over various age groups. We see that
the model reproduces the hump shaped pattern in the data. The data is from the U.S. Census
in 2000.45
6 Policy Experiments
Table 10 reports steady state outcomes for six policy regimes. We normalize output, capital,
health expenditures, consumption, welfare and all insurance premiums in the benchmark economy
to 100. The first regime, the benchmark economy, allows workers to choose between a low and a
high deductible insurance and forces retirees into Medicare. Steady state results are presented in
column one of table 10. We have already discussed the calibration of this regime in the previous
section. We then model the introduction of HSAs under alternate policy specifications. In all
of these experiments we will concentrate on the number of insured workers and the fraction of
aggregate health expenditures as percentage of GDP. We then investigate the effects on savings,
output, insurance prices, insurance composition, and the wealth distribution.
6.1 Regime 2: Health Savings Accounts
The introduction of HSAs (2nd column in table 10 and figure 3) decreases aggregate health
expenditures as a fraction of GDP from 17.6% to 14.4%. At the same time, the total fraction of
insured individuals decreases from 80% to 75%.
With the introduction of HSAs agents shift savings from standard assets into their HSAs.
Total savings increase by 1.2% compared to the benchmark model.46 Aggregate health capital
decreases as a consequence of the lower expenditure on health services (decrease in health capital
of 5.5%). The overall effect of the increase in physical capital and the decrease in health capital
is a 3% decrease in output. This will lower income of the households.47
44Since an overlappings generations model with a bequest motive has properties of an infinite horizon model, we
would not be able to simply solve the model backwards anymore but would have to iterate on the value function.
This would require for the conditions of the contraction mapping theorem to hold. Since we use various step
functions in the model (e.g. tax penalty) in addition to the discrete insurance choice setup, we are not positive
whether monotonicity of the value function still holds in which case the contraction mapping theorem would break
down.
Computationally the introduction of a bequest motive means that the algorithm that we use so far would have
to be applied repeatedly until converence of the value function. The current version of the model runs roughly 7 to
8 hours on Indiana University’s supercomputer using optimized Fortran code. Repeated execution of the algorithm
would increase computation time accordingly with no guarantee of convergence due to non-convexities.
45Compare http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/wealth/1998_2000/wlth00-1.html for the asset age distribution.
46Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995) have shown that the introduction of tax preferred 401 (k) plan did increase net
savings despite the availability of a close savings substitute like individual retirement accounts (IRAs) . A HSA
which substitutes away from traditional insurance with low deductibles to high deductible insurances is therefore
likely to increase net savings. Since we do not model IRAs or 401 (k) plans in this model we cannot quantify this
effect.
47Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2004) estimate that a one-year improvement in a population’s life expectancy
contributes to an increase of 4% in output. They conclude that since this effect is so large, an increase in expendit-
ures on improving health may be justified purely on the grounds of its impact on labor productivity, quite apart
from the direct effect of improved health on welfare.
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On the other hand, after HSAs are introduced the relative price for the high deductible
insurance declines. More agents buy the high deductible insurance. The high deductible reduces
moral hazard and agents demand fewer of the discretionary health services. This effect decreases
total health expenditures.
HSAs increase the average price of discretionary health services relative to consumption.
Therefore, consumption increases by 7% as consumers shift their expenditures from health services
into consumption. Another consequence of this change in the relative price is that 52% of all
retirees spend money saved in HSAs on non-health related consumption which forces them to
pay the forgone income tax. Agents therefore seem to “oversave” in HSAs, so that when they
retire they have excess funds to spend. This is consistent with results from GAO (2006) which
state that only half of the owners of HSAs have actually withdrawn funds in 2004 to pay for their
health treatments. Finally, government tax revenue decreases due to the tax preferred treatment
of savings in HSAs. We therefore observe an adverse effect on government spending, a decrease
from around 20% of GDP to 15% of GDP. HSAs are therefore very likely to add to fiscal deficits
(see Park, Greenstein and Friedman (2006)).
6.1.1 Insurance
The insurance landscape changes dramatically. The fraction of agents buying the low deductible
insurance decreases from 73% to 11%, whereas the fraction of agents buying the high deductible
insurance increases from 3.6% in the benchmark economy to 59%. The introduction of HSAs
decreases the average insurance premiums of both, the low and the high deductible insurance.
This has to do with some of the high risk agents moving out of the low deductible insurance into
the high deductible insurance, so that the premiums for low deductible insurances drop. Overall
the decrease in the insurance premiums is not enough to compensate for the loss of income from
the lower output, so that overall the number of uninsured individuals increases.
The Medicare premium increases drastically by 29%. This has to do with the lower health
states of all agents which increases the marginal utility of health at higher ages. Since we force
all agents older than 65 into Medicare, these agents then use the insurance to “replenish” their
low health especially in the context of the larger health shocks at higher ages. The increase in
the Medicare premium is then the direct effect of the requirement that the program has to satisfy
the Medicare budget constraint.
The Gini coefficient decreases slightly from 0.728 to 0.713 and welfare increases moderately
from −100 to −97.
6.1.2 Shifts in the Number of Insured Workers
Figure 4 shows the fraction of insured workers (low deductible insurance or high deductible
insurance) for regime [1] and regime [2] . We track the number of insured workers per age group,
income quintile, and health capital status and compare how the insured population changes when
we introduce HSAs. From panel 1 we see that the very young lose their insurance coverage after
the introduction of HSAs whereas the group of the middle aged gains coverage. Panel 2 indicates
that no particular income group stands to lose insurance coverage disproportionately. Panel 3
shows that HSAs increase coverage of the “sicker” population with lower health capital, whereas
coverage of the high health capital group drops. This is contrary to the findings in Greene et al.
(2006) who report that healthier individuals are more likely to have HSAs. The discrepancy
can be explained by the full information structure of our model and the long run equilibrium
result of our solution. Greene et al. (2006) results are based on 2004 data and reflect the short
experience of their survey participants with HSAs. Finally, in panel 4 we illustrate the change
in health capital holdings per age group before and after the introduction of HSAs. We see that
the drop in health capital predominantly affects middle age workers. Health capital over age
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does not follow a hump shape pattern. When Medicare becomes available, agents have access to
relatively cheap health services and start replenishing their health stocks at higher ages. This
effect becomes more extreme with the introduction of HSAs because HSAs kept the health capital
at lower levels than in the benchmark economy.
6.1.3 Who Saves in HSAs?
Panel 1 in figure 5 reports the average percentage of asset holdings in HSAs by age together with
the fraction of the population having HSAs. We find that there is a non-linear relationship. The
young and the old hold more of their assets in the form of funds in HSAs, whereas the middle-aged
have a smaller fraction of their assets invested in HSAs. However, the middle aged are more likely
to have HSAs. The fact that none of the 30 year old agents buy the high deductible insurance is
consistent with the argument made by Hoffman and Tolbert (2006). They claim that low income
families do not get any additional income from tax shelters, so that HSAs, especially together
with the high deductibles, are unattractive to them. Also, the model does not indicate a clear
pattern of which age cohorts are more likely to have HSAs which confirms the findings in GAO
(2006).
Panel 2 graphs the percentage of asset holdings in HSAs and the percentage of the population
with HSAs per income quintile. We find that the annual contribution limit ensures that the
higher income households cannot shift a larger proportion of their income into HSAs. In fact,
they hold less of their assets in HSAs. Holdings in HSAs as a fraction of annual household income
is a decreasing function of the income status of the household. However, richer households are
more likely to have HSAs. This is consistent with the results in GAO (2006) that HSA plan
enrollees have higher income than households in comparison groups.
Panel 3 illustrates the percentage of assets holdings in HSAs and the fraction of the population
with HSAs by health capital status. We see that the “sickest” population is less likely to have
HSAs and if they do, the percentage of assets in HSAs is small. From panel 4 in figure 5 we
already saw that the cohort around age 30 is the one with the lowest health capital. This is also
the group that is least likely to have insurance (compare take up ratios in figure 3). This is a
direct result of the income age profile. This age group has relatively low income and faces small
health shocks. Therefore, this age group does not buy health insurance. The high price of health
services without health insurance keeps them from investing in their health capital. However,
this only holds for the lowest health capital group. The next highest group has already almost
50% of all assets invested in HSAs. Also, it turns out that the group with the smallest amount
of health capital is already fully invested into Medicare as can be seen in panel 4.
Panel 4 depicts health insurance take-up ratios by health capital status. The most striking
feature is that individuals with relatively low health states are buying the high deductible insur-
ances. This does not confirm the findings in Zabinski et al. (1999). The difference between our
result and theirs is largely explained by the health capital accumulation process. From panel 4
in figure 4 we have seen that middle aged workers have relatively low health capital. However,
this is the cohort that is most likely to invest into HSAs because for them the tax free savings
that comes with HSAs is attractive.
6.1.4 Sensitivity Analysis and General Equilibrium Effects
In order to study the role of general equilibrium effects, we fix the interest rate, wages, all
insurance premiums, and the social security tax rate at their respective benchmark levels. This
effectively turns off all feedback effects from factor markets and from insurance markets. Increases
in savings do not affect the interest rate, decreases in aggregate effective human capital will not
affect wages, and the increase in high deductible insurance will not affect the insurance premiums.
We compare the results from this partial equilibrium analysis with HSAs in table 11 (column
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3) with the results from the general equilibrium model with HSAs in regime [2]. We see that
the effects are small but nevertheless lead to overstating the total health expenditures and the
number of uninsured individuals. General equilibrium effects, in this sense, do increase the
desired outcomes from HSAs, which are to decrease health expenditures and increase the number
of individuals with health insurance.
Note that in partial equilibrium the number of insured individuals drops substantially from
80% to 73%. As more people buy the high deductible insurance (3.6% to 61%), the relative price
of health services vs. consumption and savings increases and households spend less on their
health. The direct consequence of this is that effective human capital decreases which decreases
individual income via expression (5) . Households adjust their consumption pattern to the drop
in income and buy less insurance.
We further investigate the difference between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium
effects by conducting sensitivity analysis on the health productivity parameter θ. If one believes
the argument that households only forego unnecessary treatment after buying high deductible
health insurances (e.g. Manning et al. (1987), or Matisson (2002)), then parameter θ in expression
(2) should be close to zero (θ = 1 in the benchmark economy). This effectively turns off the
influence of health in the formation of human capital. Health then stops being an investment
good and is only replenished for its consumption value. Health does not affect income or output
anymore. We report the results of introducing HSAs for θ = 0, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, and
1 in figure 7. We plot the change in the percentage of insured workers between the benchmark
economy and regime [2] with HSAs in panel one of figure 7. We call this the extensive margin. We
see that as long as health capital is an investment good, the introduction of HSAs has a negative
effect on the number of insured workers. HSAs increase the relative price of medical services
to households. As households spend less on health services, their health capital deteriorates.
Since health is productive, households lose income. This negative income effect dominates the
decline in premiums. As a result, households forgo buying insurance. If, on the other hand,
θ is small, health capital loses its investment good characteristic and turns into a consumption
good. Households average health capital is still declining, but does not carry the large negative
income effect. Since savings increase due to the tax deductibility of savings in HSAs, physical
capital drives up production in the economy. Households experience a positive income effect and
more workers buy insurance. There is no substantial difference between the partial equilibrium
results and the general equilibrium results since the large income effects always dominate the
price effects.
Panel two of figure 7 reports the effects on the intensive margin, that is the change in total
health service expenditures due to the introduction of HSAs. When health is productive (θ close
to one), negative income effects from lower health states add to the decrease in health service
expenditures. The direct price effect from the high deductible insurance which makes health
services relatively more expensive works in the same direction. Partial equilibrium results are
again very close to the general equilibrium results. If, on the other hand, health becomes more of a
consumption good, the negative income effects are diminished and households spend more on their
health than in the benchmark economy. We now observe large differences between partial- and
general equilibrium outcomes because price effects become the important distinguishing feature.
Note also that only in the range of θ ∈ (0.5, 0.8) HSAs deliver on both promises, they increase
the number of insured and decrease total health expenditures at the same time. If θ is outside of
this range, only one of the two goals can be achieved.
The second parameter that we investigate is the annual contribution limit s¯m to HSAs. There
has been a lot of discussion whether HSAs could be misused for tax evasion. The policy maker has
therefore introduced an annual savings limit, s¯m = $2.850 for an individual ($5, 350 for a family).
On the other hand, critics have questioned whether this savings limit is too low and therefore
27
does not allow agents to save enough for their health. We repeat the experiment of regime [2]
where the annual savings limit was fixed at s¯m = $2.850, with the following annual savings limits
s¯m = $2, 680; $2, 850; $3, 025; $3, 455; $4, 310; and $5, 825 and plot the steady state results in
figure 6. In addition we overlay the graph with the steady values from the benchmark economy,
regime [1] where no HSAs were allowed. We see that our earlier results are fairly robust to changes
in the annual savings limit. That is, aggregate health expenditures will decrease after introducing
HSAs, whereas the number of uninsured still increases. The latter result can be overturned when
the annual savings limit is pushed to be very large. Only in those extreme cases, will HSAs
increase the number of the insured population.
An annual savings limit of $5, 825 decreases total health expenditures and increases the num-
ber of insured individuals compared to the benchmark economy (see panel 1 and 2 in figure 6).
On the other hand, panel 8 shows that residual government expenditure G drops off steadily
as the annual savings limit increases. This is the effect from lost government revenue because
more of the savings income becomes tax free. This is also the price the government has to pay
in order to reduce total health expenditures. A policy recommendation would have to factor in
how productive this government revenue is for the economy as a whole. Since we do not model
this aspect, we are not able to address this issue.
We conclude that HSAs can decrease total health expenditures in the economy. However, this
effect is “paid for” with a larger number of uninsured individuals. Sensitivity analysis suggests
that these results are robust to changes in the yearly contribution limits to HSAs. Only if the
annual contribution limit is almost doubled, then the fraction of insured individuals stays above
the fraction of insured in the benchmark economy.
6.2 Regime 3: Extended HSAs
Owcharenko (2006) reports that one particular reform suggested by the Affordability in the In-
dividual Market Act (S.2554) would allow individuals to use HSA savings to pay for insurance
premiums (retirees are already allowed to use HSAs to pay for Medicare Plan B,C and D premi-
ums).
We implement this feature by changing the definition of net worth in the household budget
constraint for workers (expression 4) to
NWj = R
mamj−1 − o
W (mj)− 1{inj=1}pj − 1{inj=2}p
′
j.
Column [3] in table 10 reports the steady state results for this regime. We see that by allowing
workers to use their HSA funds to pay for health insurance premiums, the funds in the HSAs
remain at a lower level of 0.6 compared to 0.62 in regime [2] .We observe the interesting effect that
total health expenditures decrease by not quite as much as in regime [2] but that the number of
insured stays higher. The reason is that more workers stay in the low deductible insurance, 19%
compared to 11% in regime [2] . Because more of the high risk workers buy the insurance policies
the average prices of both private health insurance premiums increase compared to regime [2].
The Medicare premium, on the other hand, decreases from 129 to 105.
6.3 Regime 4: Privatization of Medicare with HSAs
In regime [4] we replace Medicare with HSAs. Retirees are allowed to increase their holdings in
HSAs. The total number of insured individuals increases by roughly 2%. At the same time total
health expenditures decrease from 17.6% to 16.5% of GDP.
Eliminating Medicare increases total savings by almost 4%. Due to the fall in health expendit-
ures, the health capital level in the economy is lower which effects the effective level of human
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capital that can be used in production. The next effect of the increase in physical capital and
the decrease in human capital results in a negative output effect of roughly 1%.
A relatively large fraction of workers still buys the low deductible insurance (24%). Almost
all of the retired workers buy the high deductible insurance (99%), since this insurance allows
them to keep their HSAs. Also a large fraction of retirees use funds in HSAs for consumption
purposes and therefore pay the 10% tax penalty. Since they are the ones with the higher risk
of having bad health shocks, the average insurance paid for the high deductible plan increases
by 9.6% compared to the benchmark regime. The Gini coefficient is slightly larger than in the
benchmark economy.
We conclude that abolishing Medicare leads to higher insurance premiums for the high de-
ductible insurance in the private markets but lowers total medical expenses. Output decreases
due to the productivity loss from a lower aggregate health level. Aggregate welfare improves due
to increases in savings and higher consumption levels.
6.4 Regime 5: Medicare for Workers
In this regime workers can choose between a low and high deductible private insurance. There
are no HSAs available. In addition to the private insurance, agents can also decide to buy into
Medicare during their working life. This puts the private plans in direct competition with the
public health insurance plan.48
Total health expenditures decrease slightly and the number of insured increases by 1%. We
observe a shift from the low deductible health insurance into Medicare for workers. The fraction
of workers with low deductible health insurance decreases from 73% to 59%. The fraction of high
deductible insurance holders decreases by 1%. The fraction of workers holding Medicare is 15%.
This influx of newly insured workers leads to a small increase in the Medicare premium (2.7%).
We again observe an increase in savings (3%) and a consequent increase in output (1%). The
later is possible, because human capital decreases only by 1.5% due to the small decrease in
aggregate health expenditure. Government size, aggregate welfare, and the Gini coefficient are
very similar to the benchmark economy.
We conclude that without an additional tax increase to finance Medicare and to lower its
premium, the increase in the number of insured workers is marginal.
6.5 Regime 6: No Insurances
In this regime, neither workers nor retirees are able to buy private health insurance, that is,
we also abolish the Medicare program. The only public transfer programs available are the
social insurance program TSI and the pension program TSoc. Column [6] in table 10 reports the
steady state solution. Comparing the results with the benchmark economy we note the following
differences.
Without insurance agents consume more of the consumption good and fewer health services.
This has the consequence that they save less so that the capital output ratio decreases from 2.66 to
2.4. The accumulated health capital as fraction of GDP falls below the benchmark model, whereas
consumption as fraction of GDP rises above the benchmark value. The low savings rate together
with the lower health level, decreases output by 12%. The low level of health capital decreases
aggregate welfare from −100 to −124. Due to the lack of risk sharing the Gini coefficient rises
above the Gini coefficients of all other regimes that have some kind of health insurance available.
In addition, the lack of insurance puts a lot of pressure on the low income population with
severe health shocks. For this reason 1.62% of workers and 2.29% of retirees receive transfers
48Former senator John Edwards has a similar plan in his health care reform package, see “Man of the Left”, in
The Economist, July 19, 2007.
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from the social insurance program (e.g. foodstamps, Medicaid, etc.). We conclude that without
any kind of health insurance steady state output decreases and welfare is lower than in all other
regimes with some type of insurance. Health insurance increases output and welfare.
7 Conclusion
Our results indicate that HSAs decrease total health expenditures by roughly 3% of GDP but
also increase the number of uninsured individuals by up to 5%. In addition, HSAs decrease the
effective price of the high deductible insurance. As more individuals switch from low to high
deductible health insurances the effective price of health services relative to consumption goods
increases. As a consequence, households buy fewer medical services. This results in a lower
aggregate health capital level so that productive human capital also decreases. At the same time,
savings increase due to the tax preferred treatment. However, the decrease in human capital
dominates the increase in physical capital so that overall output decreases. These results depend
critically on the productivity of health capital and on the annual contribution limit to HSAs. We
provide extensive sensitivity analysis to address both issues.
The effects on the wealth distribution are moderate but the effect on the government size are
large. After the introduction of HSAs, government revenue drops so that government size (the
residual tax revenue after deduction of transfers from the social insurance program) decreases
significantly. This raises the question whether HSAs are the most cost efficient way to curb
increases in health expenditures as one may suspect that the lost government revenue leads to
productivity losses in other sectors (e.g. less funding for public education, infrastructure, etc.).
How balanced is our assessment of the performance of HSAs? There are a few features that
are omitted from the model that we think would weaken the case of HSAs. Among the most
prominent features that we did not include are (i) adjustment costs to learn the new savings plan
(e.g. in the model all consumers immediately understand all aspects of HSAs), (ii) no fixed fees of
running insurance companies and HSAs49, and (iii) no alternative savings vehicles are available
in the benchmark model (e.g. absence of FSAs, HRAs, IRAs, and 401k’s). Since our analysis
concentrates on long run equilibria, adjustment costs play a minor role. However, it would be of
interest to include fixed costs in running HSAs and alternative tax sheltered savings vehicles since
both will affect the take up rate of high deductible insurances and the net increase in aggregate
savings. Further extensions would encompass solutions for transition paths between the policy
regimes in order to study welfare. Another interesting question concerns recent increases in health
care productivity. A fully endogenized health care production sector would be able to address
this issue. We leave this for future research.
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8 Appendix A
8.1 Tables
Parameters: Explanation/Source: Free Paras
- Periods working J1= 5
- Periods retired J2= 3
- Population growth rate n = 2.5%
- to match > 65 at 12.4%
of population (n = 1.2%
in U.S. Census 2006)
- Years modeled years = 72 from age 20 to 92
- Relative risk aversion σ = 1.5 to match KY and R 1
- Preference on consumption ηj=
{
0.65, 0.95, 0.96, 0.96,
0.95, 0.85, 0.80, 0.80
}
to match p×MY 8
- Discount factor β = 1.025(72/8) to match KY and R 1
- Health production productivity φj=
{
1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5,
1.5, 1.5, 1.65, 1.65
}
to match p×MY 8
- Production parameter of health ξ = 0.35 to match p×MY 1
- Health depreciation
δhmin= 1− 0.80
(years/J)
=0.8658
δhmax= 1− 0.87
(years/gJ)
=0.7145
to match p×MY 2
- Human capital production χ = 0.85 to match income distribution 1
- Health productivity θ = 1 used for sensitivity analysis 1
- Human capital profile
{
βˆ0, βˆ1, βˆ2
}
=
{8.12, 0.14,−0.0015}
U.S. Census 2005
- Insurance premium growth
{xˆ0, xˆ1, xˆ2}=
{0.7781, 0.0036, 0.0007}
www.eHealthInsurance.com
- Price for medical care
for insured
pm,Ins= 1.3891 U.S. Census 2004
- Price for medical care
for uninsured
pm,nIns= 2.2226 U.S. Census 2004
- Capital share in production α = 0.33 standard value
- Capital depreciation δ = 1− 0.9(years/J)= 0.6126 to match KY 1
- Total factor productivity A = 4 normalization
- Health Shocks see table 3 20
- Asset grid aGrid= [0, ..., 24]1×80
- HSA asset grid amGrid= [0, ..., 8]1×14
- Health grid hjGrid= [0.01, ..., 6]1×16
- State space 1, 881, 600
Table 1: Parameters for Calibration
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Policy Parameters: Explanation/Source:
Nr. of free
parameters
- Pension replacement rate Ψ = 0.21 to match τ soc= 10% 1
- Payroll tax Medicare: τMed= 4%
- By law this is is 2.92%.
Need to pick higher rate,
so that workers
in last period buy
Medicare Plan B, and
pMed< p.
1
- Low deductible ρ = 0.15
- to match percentage of
insured to be close to 80%
1
- High deductible ρ′= 1.15
- to match ρρ′ = 0.13 according to
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
- Medicare deductible ρMed= 0.46
- to match ρ
ρMed
= 0.28 according to
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
and the U.S. Department of Health
- Coinsurance rate, low deductible γ = 0.25 0.25 in Suen (2006)
- Coinsurance rate, high deductible γ′= 0.20 to match insurance take-up rate 1
- Coinsurance rate, Medicare γMed= 0.25
- Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (2005)
- Saving limit markup v = 0.2232
- Revenue procdure 2006-53 and
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
- Maximum contribution to HSAs s¯m= $2, 850
- Revenue procdure 2006-53 and
Fronstin and Collins (2006)
-Total number of free parameters
incl. table 1
48
Table 2: Policy Parameters for Calibration
Shock 1 Shock 2 Shock 3 Shock 4 Shock 5
Age
20-28: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10
29-38: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.34 -1.60
39-47: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -3.25
48-56: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -4.20
57-65: 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.14 -4.83
66-74: 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.40 -5.00
75-83: 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.40 -5.00
84-92: 0.00 -0.05 -0.20 -0.40 -6.00
Table 3: Health shocks per age group. Health shocks account for 20 separate free parameters.
We use identification restrictions on some of the shocks. Shocks 1,2, and 3 do not change over
age for all workers. In addition, Shocks 1,2, 3, and 4 also do not change over age for all retirees.
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Yearly Income Level: Income Tax Rate: τ
up to $7, 150 10%
$7, 151− $29, 050 15%
$29, 051− $70, 350 25%
$70, 351− $146, 750 28%
$146, 751− $319, 100 33%
over $319, 100 35%
Table 4: Source: http://taxes.yahoo.com/rates.html
Number and Percent of People by Health Insurance Coverage Type, 2000 to 2004
Year Uninsured Medicaid/SCHIP Job-Based Insurance
Number (millions) Percent Percent Percent
2000 39.8 14.2% 10.6% 63.6%
2001 41.2 14.6% 11.2% 62.6%
2002 43.6 15.2% 11.6% 61.3%
2003 45.0 15.6% 12.4% 60.6%
2004 45.8 15.7% 12.9% 59.8%
Table 5: Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2004
Deductible Levels for Policies Purchases by eHealthInsurance
Percentage of Policies Purchased
Deductible Individuals Families
$500 or less 39.1% 24.9%
$501− $999 4.1% 4.5%
$1, 000− $1, 500 28.0% 31.4%
$1, 501− $1, 999 0.7% 0.0%
$2, 000− $3, 000 18.4% 22.0%
over $3, 000 9.7% 17.25
Total 100% 100%
Table 6: Source: eHealthInsurance 2004 at www.ehealthinsurance.com/content/ Report-
New/110905CandBReportFinal.pdf
Total Health Care Expenditure: Data (in %) Model (in %)
Percent of Total Population
1% 22.000 20.609
5% 49.000 34.092
10% 64.000 45.499
50% 97.000 92.493
Table 7: Distribution of Health Expenditures in the U.S. Economy. Data is from MEPS 2002 as
summarized in Yu and Ezzati-Rice (2005).
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Gini 1. Quintile 2. Quintile 3. Quintile 4. Quintile 5. Quintile
Wealth:
Data 1992 0.780 -0.390 1.740 5.720 13.430 79.490
Data 1998 0.803 -0.300 1.300 5.000 12.200 81.700
Model 0.728 0.000 0.000 0.810 17.108 82.082
Income:
Data 1998 0.553 2.400 7.200 12.500 20.000 58.000
Model 0.430 3.923 8.094 19.089 29.044 39.850
Table 8: Distribution of Wealth in the U.S. Economy (%). 1992 Data from Diaz-Gimenez,
Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and 1998 data from Budria-Rodriguez et al. (2002).
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Param eters M odel Data Source Nr. of M oments
- M ed ical exp enses p er GDP:
pm×M
Y 17.6% 16% Baicker (2006) 1
- Fraction of insured workers:
(private insurance)
53%
- 86.1% of <65:
private 69% (employm ent
based 59 .8% ) public : 19%
- M eps 2005 and
U.S . Census Bureay 2006
1
- Fraction of insured workers:
(private insurance, not counting
un insured in fi rst generation)
76.55%
- 86.1% of <65:
private 69% (employm ent
based 59 .8% ) public : 19%
- M eps 2005 and
U.S . Census Bureay 2006
1
- Fraction o f in sured retirees : 99.7% 99.7% MEPS 2005 1
- Low deductib le insurance (of all insured) 95.4% 90% Fronstin and Collin s (2006) 1
- H igh deductible insurance (o f all in sured) 4 .6% 10% Fronstin and Collin s (2006) 1
- Ratio of low vs. high deductible
prem ium :
∑
j µjpj/
∑
j µjp
′
j
0 .72 0 .6 to 1 .2
- Fronstin and Collins (2006)
and C laxton et a l. (2006)
1
- Ratio of low deductib le vs.
M edicare prem ium :
∑
j µjpj∑
j µjp
Med
j
1 .22 0 .13 to 3.86
- Fronstin and Collins (2006),
C laxton et al. (2006), and
U.S . Departm ent of Health 2006
1
- Ratio of average
low deductible prem ium
vs. m ed ian incom e:
∑
j µjpj
med(income)
0 .12 0 .07 to 0.23
- Fronstin and Collins (2006),
C laxton et al. (2006) and
U.S . Census 2005
1
Ratio deductib le vs. average prem ium
- Low deductib le p lan :
ρ∑
j µjpj
0 .17 0 .07 to 0.23
- Fronstin and Collins (2006),
C laxton et al. (2006), and
U.S . Departm ent of Health 2006
1
- H ighdeductib le p lan:
ρ′∑
j µjp
′
j
0 .95 0 .66 to 1.15 - sam e source as above, 1
- M ed icare:
ρMed∑
j µjp
med
j
0 .74 1 U .S. Departm ent o f Hea lth 2006 1
Ratio deductib le vs. median incom e
- Low deductib le p lan :
ρ
med(income) 0 .02 0 .017
- Fronstin and Collins (2006) and
U.S . Census 2005
1
- H ighdeductib le p lan:
ρ′
med(income) 0 .16 0 .13
- Fronstin and Collins (2006) and
U.S . Census 2005
1
- Med icare:
ρMed
med(income) 0 .07 0 .06
U.S . Departm ent of Health 2006
and U .S . C ensus 2005
1
- Capital output ratio: K/Y 2.7 3 N IPA 1
- Interest rate: R 4 .6% 4% NIPA 1
- Governm ent consumption : G/Y 20.3% 20.2% Castaneda et al. (2003) 1
- S ize o f So cial Security : So cSec/Y 6.3% 5% Social Security Adm inistration 2002 1
- S ize o f M ed icare: M ed icare/Y 4.4% 2.5% U .S. Departm ent o f Hea lth 2002 1
- Fraction over 65 13.97% 12.4% U .S. Census 2005
- Payroll tax Social Security : τSoc 10.2% 6%-10% IRS 5 0 and 1
- Average marginal
incom e tax: τ¯
11% 21.5% to 32 .1%
- Stephenson (1998) and
Barro and Sahasaku l (1986)
1
- G in i Wealth 0 .73 0 .8 Budria-Rodriguez et a l. (2002) 1
- G in i Income 0 .43 0 .55 Budria-Rodriguez et a l. (2002) 1
- Incom e and savings profi le see figure 2 14
- Insurance take-up ratios see figure 2 10
Tota l number o f M oments 48
Table 9: Data vs. Model
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[1 Benchmark] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Health Expenditures (in % of GDP): 17.642 14.367 15.105 16.500 17.413 11.024
All Insured (in %): 80.136 75.033 77.068 81.949 81.503 0.000
Output Y : 100.000 97.017 96.712 99.099 101.072 87.993
Capital K : 100.000 101.172 98.655 103.991 102.964 79.734
Health Capital H : 100.000 84.521 86.039 89.963 98.499 66.381
K/Y : 2.662 2.776 2.715 2.793 2.712 2.412
H/Y : 5.280 4.600 4.698 4.794 5.146 3.984
Assets a : 1.258 0.683 0.974 0.651 1.299 0.986
Assets in HSA am : 0.000 0.622 0.258 0.669 0.000 0.000
Consumption C : 100.000 107.236 107.636 104.797 101.370 119.616
C/Y : 0.319 0.353 0.356 0.338 0.320 0.434
Interest Rate R = 1 + r: 1.046 1.043 1.045 1.042 1.045 1.055
Social Security Tax τSoc : 0.102 0.108 0.108 0.109 0.102 0.105
Avge. Marg. Income Tax: τ : 0.109 0.099 0.099 0.100 0.110 0.105
% of Workers paying Penalty: 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
% of Retirees paying Penalty: 0.000 52.414 11.426 33.934 0.000 0.000
TSI Worker in %: 0.319 0.445 0.394 0.314 9.178 1.623
TSI Retiree (in %): 0.022 0.019 0.019 1.074 0.021 2.290
Insured Workers Low (in %): 72.955 11.107 18.808 23.952 59.309 0.000
Insured Workers High(in %): 3.594 59.387 54.092 54.775 2.644 0.000
Insured Workers (in %): 76.549 70.494 72.900 78.728 77.246 0.000
Insured Retirees Low (in %): 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.000
InsuredRetirees High (in %): 0.000 0.000 0.000 99.089 0.000 0.000
Insured Retirees (in %): 99.714 99.805 99.810 99.527 99.752 0.000
All Insured(in %): 80.136 75.033 77.068 81.949 81.503 0.000
Insurance Premium pLow: 0.597 0.597 0.608 0.606 0.608 0.000
Insurance Premium pHigh: 0.627 0.634 0.642 0.590 0.628 0.000
Average Insurance Premium pLow: 100.000 73.935 77.743 78.218 90.020 0.000
Average Insurance Premium pHigh: 100.000 87.388 90.488 109.612 89.919 0.000
Medicare Premium pMed : 100.000 128.750 105.086 0.000 102.751 0.000
Government Size G/Y (in %): 20.277 15.404 16.033 16.470 20.371 11.458
Aggregate Welfare: -100.000 -96.776 -96.658 -96.815 -99.475 -124.108
Gini Coefficient: 0.728 0.713 0.721 0.732 0.728 0.748
Table 10: Six Regimes: [1 Benchmark] two insurance types witout HSAs, [2] two insurance
types with HSAs, [3] HSAs funds can be used to pay health care premiums , [4] HSAs without
Medicare, [5] workers can buy into Medicare, and [6] no insurance. In regime [1], [2], [3], [4],
and [5] agents can choose between low and high deductible insurances. In regime [1], [5] and [6]
HSAs are not available. In regime [2], [3] and [4] the high deductible insurance can be linked to
an HSA.
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[1 Benchmark] [2] no G.E. Effects
Health Expenditures (in % of GDP): 17.642 14.367 14.011
All Insured (in %): 80.136 75.033 73.383
Output Y : 100.000 97.017 100.000
Capital K : 100.000 101.172 102.931
Health Capital H : 100.000 84.521 83.688
K/Y : 2.662 2.776 2.740
H/Y : 5.280 4.600 4.419
Assets a : 1.258 0.683 0.669
Assets in HSA am : 0.000 0.622 0.644
Consumption C : 100.000 107.236 110.407
C/Y : 0.319 0.353 0.353
Interest Rate R = 1 + r: 1.046 1.043 1.046
Social Security Tax τSoc : 0.102 0.108 0.102
Avge. Marg. Income Tax: τ : 0.109 0.099 0.098
% of Workers paying Penalty: 0.000 0.000 0.000
% of Retirees paying Penalty: 0.000 52.414 77.615
TSI Worker (in %): 0.319 0.445 0.485
TSI Retiree (in %): 0.022 0.019 0.018
Insured Workers Low (in %): 72.955 11.107 7.676
Insured Workers High(in %): 3.594 59.387 60.863
Insured Workers (in %): 76.549 70.494 68.538
Insured Retirees Low(in %): 0.000 0.000 0.000
InsuredRetirees High(in %): 0.000 0.000 0.000
Insured Retirees (in %): 99.714 99.805 99.821
All Insured (in %): 80.136 75.033 73.383
Insurance Premium pLow: 0.597 0.597 0.597
Insurance Premium pHigh: 0.627 0.634 0.627
Average Insurance Premium pLow: 100.000 73.935 72.790
Average Insurance Premium pHigh: 100.000 87.388 85.984
Medicare Premium pMed : 100.000 128.750 99.999
Government Size G/Y (in %): 20.277 15.404 14.916
Aggregate Welfare: -100.000 -96.776 -95.432
Gini Coefficient: 0.728 0.713 0.709
Table 11: Three Regimes: [1 Benchmark] two insurance types witout HSAs, [2] two insurance
types with HSAs, and [no G.E. Effects] has two insurance types with HSAs where we fixed prices
w, R, p, p′, pMed, and τSoc to benchmark levels.
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Figure 1: Panel (1): Conditional Survival Probabilities from U.S. Life-Tables 2003. Panel (2):
Premium Markup per Age Group. Source: 2005 Data from www.ehealthinsurance.com. Panel
(3): Income Tax Function Approximation.
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Figure 2: [1] Benchmark Model: 2 Insurances and no HSAs. Panel (1): Health Insurance Coverage
of the Civilian Noninsititutionalized Population in the U.S. 2005. Source: MEPS 2005. Panel
(2): Human Capital Profile and Income Data per Age Cohort. Source: U.S. Census 2006, CPS.
Panel (3): Wealth Age Distribution. Source: Data U.S. Census 2000.
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Figure 3: Regime [2]: 2 Insurances and HSAs. Panel (1): Health Insurance Coverage of the
Civilian Noninsititutionalized Population in the U.S. 2005. Source: MEPS 2005. Panel (2):
Human Capital Profile and Income Data per Age Cohort. Source: U.S. Census 2006, CPS. Panel
(3): Wealth Age Distribution. Source: Data U.S. Census 2000.
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Figure 4: Fraction of insured workers before and after the policy experiment of introducing HSAs.
Panel (1): Percentage of insured workers per age group. Panel (2): Percentage of insured workers
per income quintile. Panel (3): Percentage of insured workers per health capital state. Panel (4):
Average health capital per age group.
45
20 40 60 80
0
20
40
60
80
100
[1] HSAs by Age
Age
%
% with HSA
% of Assets in HSA
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
0
20
40
60
80
100
[2] HSAs by Income
Income Quintiles
%
% with HSA
% of Assets in HSA
0 1 2 3 4
0
20
40
60
80
100
[3] HSAs by Health Status
Health Status
%
0 1 2 3 4
0
20
40
60
80
100
[4] Percentage of Insurance Coverage
Health Status
%
Total Insured
Low Deductible
High Deductible
Medicare
Figure 5: Panel (1): Percentage of assets held in the form of funds in HSAs by age group and
percentage of the population with HSAs per age group. Panel (2): Percentage of assets held
in the form of funds in HSAs by income quintile and percentage of the population with HSAs
by income quinitile. Panel (3): Percent of assets in HSAs by health state and percent of the
population with HSAs by health state. Panel (4): Percentage of insurance coverage type by
health state. All results are for regime [2], the model with two insurance types and HSAs.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity Analysis. We vary the annual contribution limit to HSAs, according to
a¯m = {$2, 050; $2, 680; $2, 850; $3, 025; $3, 455; $4, 310; $5, 825} and compare the results to
the benchmark economy [1 Benchmark] with no HSAs.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity Analysis. We vary the health productivity parameter θ according to θ =
{0, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1} and compare the General Equilibrium with HSAs result and the
Partial Equilibrium with HSAs result to the benchmark economy [1 Benchmark] with no HSAs.
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